Two Cheers for the Foreign Tax Credit, Even in the BEPS Era by Fleming, J. Clifton, Jr. et al.
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Faculty Scholarship
12-31-2016
Two Cheers for the Foreign Tax Credit, Even in the
BEPS Era
J. Clifton Fleming Jr.
BYU Law, flemingc@law.byu.edu
Robert J. Peroni
University of Texas School of Law, rperoni@law.utexas.edu
Stephen E. Shay
Harvard Law School, sshay@law.harvard.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Taxation-Transnational Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
J. Clifton Fleming Jr., Robert J. Peroni, and Stephen E. Shay, ??? ?????? ??? ??? ??????? ??? ??????, ???? ?? ??? ???? ???, 91 Tᴜʟᴀɴᴇ L. Rᴇᴠ.
1 (2016).
TULANE
LAW REVIEW
VOL. 91 NOvEMBER 2016 No. 1
Two Cheers for the Foreign Tax Credit,
Even in the BEPS Era*
J. Clifton Fleming, Jr.,** Robert J. Peroni,***
and Stephen E. Shay****
Reform of the US. interntonal income taxation system has been a hotly debated topic
formanyyeamy. The prncial competing alternatives ar a teritonal or exemption system and
a worldwide system. For rasons summarized in this Aticle, we favor worldwide taxation ifit
is mal worldwide taxaton that is, a nondefered US tax is imposed on all foreign income of
US. esidents at the time the income is earned However this approach is not acceptable
unless the resulting double taxation is allewated The longstandng US. approach for handling
the iternational double taxation problem is a foreign tax credit lAited to the US. levy on the
taxpayerk foregn income Indeed the forign tax credit is an essential element of the case for
worldwide taxation. Moreover termtonal systems ofien apply worldwide taxation with a
* C 2016 by J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay. All rights
reserved. Thanks for comments on earlier drafts of this Article from Omri Marian, Alvin C.
Warren, Jr., participants in the Doctor of International Business Taxation Program at the
Vienna University of Economics and Business, and participants in an international tax panel
at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools 2015 annual meeting. The views expressed
in this Article are those of the authors and do not reflect those of their universities, any
organization for which any of the authors serves as an officer or renders pro bono services,
or, in the case of Mr. Shay, any client.
** Ernest L. Wilkinson Chair and Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School,
Brigham Young University.
*** Fondren Foundation Centennial Chair for Faculty Excellence and Professor of
Law, The University of Texas School of Law. Professor Peroni dedicates this Article to his
loving parents, Betty Peroni and the late Emil Peroni, for their tremendous support and
inspiration over the years. Professor Peroni thanks Dean Ward Farnsworth and the University
of Texas School of Law for their generous research support.
**** Senior Lecturer, Harvard Law School. Mr. Shay discloses certain activities not
connected with his position at Harvard Law School, one or more of which may relate to the
subject matter of this Article, at https://helios.law.harvard.edu/public/ConflictOfInterest
Report.aspxid=10794.
1
2 TULANE LAWREVIEW [Vol. 91:1
forin tax crdt to all icome ofresident ididuals as well as the passive hicome and tax
haven mcome ofresident corpoitions. Thus, the foreign tax credt also is an inportant feature
ofmany tenitonal systems.
The foreign tax credt has been subjected to sharp cnticisms though, and Professor
Daniel Shaviro has recently proposed replacing the credit with a combiation of a deduction
for foreign taxes and a reduced US tax rate on foreign icome In this Article, we respond to
the cnticisms and argue that the foreign tax credit is a robust and effective device.
Furthenmore, we respectfully explain why Professor Shavkok proposal is not an adequate
substitute. We also explore an overlooked aspect of the foreign tax credt-its role as an
allocator ofthe international tax base between residence and source countries-and we explain
the credth effectveness i carrying out this role. Nevertheless, we point out that the credt
ments only two cheers because it goes beyond the requiements of the ability-to-pay ptinciple
that underlies use of an income base for imposing tax (instead of a consumption base).
Ultinately the credit is the preferred approach for mitgating international double taxation of
income.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Under customary international law, every country has a right to
impose both source-based taxation on income earned within its
borders by foreign persons' and residence-based taxation on the
worldwide incomes-that is, the sum of domestic and foreign
income-of its own residents.2 If two countries fully exercise these
indisputable rights in relation to the same income, international
double taxation is inevitable. This is because residents of any given
country who earn income in a second country will have that income
taxed by the second country under its source taxation right and by the
residence country under its residence taxation right.3 This double
taxation would be a serious impediment to international commerce
and result in a decline in economic efficiency and each country's
economic welfare.! Consequently, customary international law
prescribes that the source taxation right is paramount and that
1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 411-12 (AM. LAW INST. 1986); REUVEN S. AvI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 27 (2007); Ilan
Benshalom, The New Poor at Our Gates: Global Justice Implications for International Tzade
and Tax Law, 85 N.YU. L. REV 1, 75 (2010); Allison Christians, Sovereg Taxation and
Social Contac 18 MINN. J. INT'L L. 99, 104, 110-11 (2009); Manal S. Corwin, Sense and
Sensibility: The Policy and Politics of BEPS, 145 TAX NOTES 133, 138 (2014); Jinyan Li,
Improving Inter-nation Equity Through Tenitoial Taxation and Tax Spanag, m
GLOBALZATION AND ITS TAX DISCONTENTS: TAX POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS
117, 120 (Arthur J. Cockfield ed., 2010); Wolfgang Sch6n, International Tax Coordination
for a Second-Best World (Part I), WORLD TAX J., Oct. 2009, at 67, 72-73. For normative
justifications of this rule, see ROY ROHATGI, BASIC INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 12 (2002);
Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture,
"Whath Source Got to Do with It?" Source Rules and US. International Taxation, 56 TAX L.
REv. 81, 88-106 (2002).
2. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 412(l)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1986); AVI-YONAH, supra note 1, at 22-27; Benshalom,
supia note 1, at 75; Christians, supra note 1, at 104, 110-11; Corwin, suple note 1, at 138;
Sch6n, supra note 1, at 90-91. For a normative justification of this rule, see ROHATGI, supra
note 1, at 12; J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fainess M
International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxmg Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX
REv. 299 (2001) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness in International Taxation]. For
a discussion of the connection of source-based taxation and residence-based taxation to the
international law concept of sovereignty, see Diane M. Ring, Whath at Stake in the
SoveregntyDebate? International Tax and the Nation-State, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 155 (2008).
3. See CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON, ROBERT J. PERONI & RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH,
TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 22, 304 (4th ed. 2011); IMF, Spillovels in
International Corporate Taxation, Policy Paper, at 9 (May 2014); Sch6n, supra note 1, at 72-
73.
4. See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 3, at 23-24, 304.
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residence countries' have the unilateral responsibility to mitigate
international double taxation by adjusting the residence tax burden.'
The exemption system is one of the two commonly used
unilateral methods by which residence countries discharge this
responsibility.' Under this approach, foreign business income that
bears a meaningful foreign tax is eliminated (exempted) from the
residence country's income tax base so that it bears a zero residence
tax.' This approach is also commonly called a territorial system
because a country that employs it taxes only income generated within
its territorial borders.
The other principal approach for providing unilateral relief from
international double taxation is a worldwide system with a foreign tax
credit.' A country employing such a system imposes a tentative tax on
5. The residence country is the country where the taxpayer is a resident. Obviously,
the definition of resident is critically important but is outside the scope of this Article. For
discussions of this issue, see HUGH I AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME
TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 431-36 (3d ed. 2010); GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH,
supm note 3, at 41-60; 1 JOEL D. KUNTz & ROBERT J. PERONI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
¶B1.02[2] (1992 & 2016 cum. sup. no. 2).
6. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 413 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1986); see also Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev.
[OECD], Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, arts. 23A, 23B (July 15, 2014),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-2015-full-
version-9789264239081-en.htm [hereinafter OECD, Model Tax Convention] (prescribing
methods countries may use to eliminate double taxation); U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Aff.,
Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developig Countries, arts.
23A, 23B (2011), http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/UN_Model_201 1Update.pdf; Yariv
Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REv 259, 265-66, 284
(2003).
7. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. No. 4150, OPTIONS FOR TAXING U.S.
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 3 (2013) [hereinafter CBO, OPTIONS FOR TAXING]; J. Clifton
Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Formulary Apportionment n the US
International Income Tax System: Putting Lipstick on a Pg?, 36 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 16-18
(2014) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, FormularyApportionmend.
8. See sources cited supm note 7. However, some countries, including Canada and
the Netherlands, allow foreign business income to qualify for exemption without regard to
whether it has been subjected to a "meaningful" level of foreign tax. See STAFF OF JOINT
CoMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-33-1 1, BACKGROUND AND SELECTED ISSUES RELATED TO THE U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TAX SYSTEM AND SYSTEMS THAT EXEMPT FOREIGN BUSINESS INCOME 19-20,
32-33 (2011) [hereinafter JoINT Comm., BACKGROUNDAND ISSUES].
9. A country can tax its residents on their worldwide incomes without a credit for
foreign taxes and, instead, allow its residents to treat foreign tax payments as deductible
expenses in calculating their residence country tax liability. This approach is largely
ineffective in alleviating international double taxation and is little used. See STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-22-06, THE IMIACT OF INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM:
BACKGROUND AND SELECTED ISSUES RELATING To U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX RULES AND THE
COMPETITIVENESS OF U.S. BUSINESSEs 60 (2006) [hereinafter JOINT COMM., IMPACT OF
INTERNATIONAL TAx REFORM]; GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 3, at 23-24.
Moreover, allowing only a deduction for foreign income taxes would conflict with the income
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the worldwide income of each resident and then mitigates double
taxation by subtracting a credit for foreign source country tax from
the tentative residence country tax.o If the residence country tax is
greater than the source country tax, the residence country collects
only the excess, which is commonly referred to as a residual tax." If
the foreign source country tax is equal to or greater than the tentative
residence country tax, the residence country collects nothing.12
However, the U.S. foreign tax credit is limited to the amount of
tentative residence country tax that would otherwise apply to the
foreign-source taxable income." Thus, the United States does not
reimburse taxpayers for source tax in excess of the tentative U.S.
residence country tax on foreign-source taxable income from the
same foreign tax credit limitation category.4
tax treaty obligations of the United States to allow a foreign tax credit in mitigation of double
taxation. See United States Model Income Tax Convention, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY art. 23
(Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/
Treaty-US%20Model-2016.pdf [hereinafter 2016 U.S. MODEL]. The United States previously
allowed only 90% of foreign taxes as a credit against the alternative minimum tax. In
Lindsey v Commissioner, the Tax Court upheld the validity of the 90% limitation on the
foreign tax credit against alternative minimum tax despite the U.S.-Switzerland income tax
treaty, under which the United States agreed to allow a foreign tax credit to avoid double
taxation. Lindsey v. Comm'r, 98 T.C. 672, 677 (1992), aff'4 15 F3d 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
This 90% limit was enacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 701(a),
100 Stat. 2085, 232045, but was repealed by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108-357, § 421(a)(1), 118 Stat. 1418, 1574.
10. See CBO, OPTIONS FOR TAXING, supra note 7, at 3; GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH,
supm note 3, at 39, 307-08.
11. See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 3, at 39, 307-08, 485-91. U.S.
residual tax is the U.S. income tax liability that remains after a credit for foreign income tax is
subtracted from the U.S. income tax that would be imposed if no credit were allowed.
12. SeeAuL & ARNOLD, supra note 5, at 447.
13. See GusTAFsoN, PERONI & PUGH, supm note 3, at 39, 406-08. Foreign-source
taxable income for this purpose is determined by foreign tax credit limitation category and
after taking into account deductions allocable to the foreign-source income, including an
allocable share of deductions incurred by a shareholder claiming an indirect credit under
I.R.C. § 902. See 1 KuNTZ & PERONI, supm note 5, I¶A2.05[2], B4.16[2][a]. We have
previously observed that U.S. rules likely under-allocate such indirect expenses to foreign-
source income. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Designing a
US Exemption System for Foreign Income When the Treaswy is Empty, 13 FLA. TAX REV.
397, 448-50 (2012); Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Territoniality
M Search ofPnociples and Revenue: Camp and Enz.4 141 TAX NOTES 173, 181 (2013); see
also Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform, 59 TAX LAw. 649, 765-71 (2006)
(providing an overview of how expenses are allocated and apportioned under U.S. law). As a
consequence, the limitation is expanded, which may result in an over-allowance of foreign
taxes as a credit. The rules for allocating deductions to foreign-source income are a critical
element in properly determining income under a foreign tax credit limitation or a territorial
system of taxation but will not be discussed in detail here.
14. JoINT COMM., IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL TAx REFORM, suprm note 9, at 65-66;
Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform, supra note 13. This is a standard
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In prior work we have explained that although the United States
purports to operate a worldwide system with a foreign tax credit,
deferral," loose transfer pricing enforcement, and cross-crediting"
actually cause the U.S. regime to function largely as an overly
complex and elective territorial system." Our work has pointed out
that to transform the present U.S. system into a real worldwide
system, it is necessary to abolish or severely limit deferral and to
structure the foreign tax credit so that cross-crediting is substantially
curtailed."
Obviously, the foreign tax credit is a critically important element
with respect to both (1) the current U.S. international income tax
regime and (2) a U.S. regime that is reformed into a real worldwide
system. The credit is, however, also important in the systems of
countries that employ exemption or territorial regimes. This is so
because those systems are typically applied only to active foreign
business income of resident corporations that is subject to a
meaningful level of foreign tax. Countries using these regimes often
apply worldwide taxation to all passive foreign income and tax haven
foreign business income received by their corporate residents and to
both active and passive foreign income earned by their noncorporate
international practice. See Paul R. McDaniel, Teitonal vs Worldwide International Tax
Systems: Which Is Better for the US..2 8 FLA. TAX REv. 283, 298 (2007). Under current law,
as a result of changes made by Congress in 2004 legislation, the U.S. foreign tax credit
limitation generally has only two categories: (1) foreign-source passive income and (2) all
other foreign-source income. I.R.C. § 904(d) (2012). Under certain circumstances, income
may be isolated into a separate foreign tax credit limitation category. See, e.g., id.
§ 865(h)(1XB).
15. The deferral privilege is a feature of U.S. international income tax law that
generally allows a U.S. person to conduct profitable overseas business or investment activities
through a low-taxed controlled foreign corporation without paying U.S. residual tax until the
controlled foreign corporation distributes its foreign-source earnings or until the U.S. person
sells the foreign corporation's stock. See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, suprd note 3, at 24-26.
16. Cross-crediting occurs when foreign tax credits in excess of U.S. tax on high-
taxed foreign-source income are used to reduce the U.S. residual tax on low- or zero-taxed
foreign-source income. See CBO, OPTIONS FOR TAXING, supra note 7, at 7-9; GUSTAFSON,
PERONI & PUGH, supra note 3, at 407-10; 1 KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 5, T B4.16[5][a]; J.
Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Worse than Exemption, 59 EMORY
L. J. 79, 132-37 (2009) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse than Exemption].
17. See generally Fleming, Peroni, & Shay, Worse than Exemption, supra note 16
(explaining why the current U.S. system functions much like an elective and poorly designed
territorial regime); Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REv. 699, 717-26
(2011) [hereinafter Kleinbard, Stateless Income].
18. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, FormularyApportionmen4 supa note 7, at 18-20.
If deferral were abolished, aggressive transfer pricing would have much reduced importance
with regard to outbound international business activity.
19. See JOINT COMM., BACKGROUND AND ISSUES, supra note 8, at 8.
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residents.20 Whenever this income is also taxed in the country where it
is earned, double taxation results. Accordingly, exemption system
countries often make a foreign tax credit available with respect to
these types of income.2 '
Thus, the soundness of the foreign tax credit as a double tax
mitigation device is an important matter for both worldwide and
territorial regimes. The credit has been criticized for being somewhat
more complex than the exemption or territorial approach.22 This
criticism is indisputable,23 and although we have previously suggested
certain simplifications,24 substantial complexity is an unavoidable
characteristic of a well-functioning foreign tax credit regime. We
have explained that this complexity should nevertheless be tolerated
because it falls mostly on a relatively small population of taxpayers
who have the sophistication and resources to address it.25 In addition,
20. See JOINT COMM., BACKGROUND AND ISSUES, supra note 8, at 8; STAFF OF JoINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-02-05, OPTIONS To IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX
EXPENDITURES 187, 190 (2005) [hereinafter JOINT COMM., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE];
Approaches To Improve the Competitiveness of the US. Business Tax System for the 21st
Century, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY 57, 59-60 (Dec. 20, 2007), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Improve-Competitiveness-2007.pdf; AULT & ARNOLD,
supra note 5, at 447-48; Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 17, at 717; Katrin
Laschewski & Christian Laschewski, The Impact of the International Tax System of the
Home Country on the Location Decision of a Foreign Permanent Establishment: The Case of
Germany, 7 WORLD TAx J. 171, 172-74 (2015).
21. See JOINT COMM., BACKGROUND AND ISSUES, supa note 8; AULT & ARNOLD,
supra note 5, at 448-51; see also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-55-08, EcONOMIC
EFFICIENCY AND STRUCTURAL ANALYSES OF ALTERNATIVE U.S. TAX POLICIES FOR FOREIGN
DIRECT INvESTMENT 24 (2008) [hereinafter JOINT COMM., ALTERNATIVE POLICIES]
(explaining that a U.S. exemption system would employ a foreign tax credit with respect to
non-exempt income); Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 17, at 717.
22. See JOINT COMM., OPTIONS To IMPROVE, supra note 20, at 189, 193-94;
PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAx REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-GROWTH:
PROPOSALS TO FIx AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY 104, 134 (Nov. 2005),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Fix-Tax-System- 20 05.
pdf; AuLT & ARNOLD, supia note 5, at 448; 2 NAT'L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, THE NFTC
FOREIGN INCOME PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 52 (2001)
[hereinafter NFTC 2]. For a classic commentary on the complexity of the U.S. foreign tax
credit and the causes thereof, see Charles I. Kingson, The Foreign Tax Credit and Its Citics, 9
Am. J. TAx POLY 1, 3-15 (1991).
23. But see J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Exploring the Contours of a
Proposed US. Exemption (Territorial) Tax System, 109 TAX NOTES 1557, 1560-68 (2005)
(explaining that well-designed territorial systems are significantly complex); Kingson, supra
note 22, at 52-54 (same).
24. See Robert J. Peroni, A litchhikerk Guide to Reform of the Foreign Tax Credit
Lhnitation, 56 SMU L. REv 391 (2003) (explaining ways in which the foreign tax credit can
be simplified); Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, Reform and
Sinplification of the US Foreign Tax Credit Rules, 101 TAX NOTES 103 (2003) (same).
25. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, FormularyAppordionmen4 supa note 7, at 28; see
also JOEL SLEMROD & CHRISTIAN GILLITZER, TAX SYSTEMS 8-9 (2014) ("[C]omplexity in the
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a foreign tax credit that restricts cross-crediting contributes
significantly to making income taxation a nonfactor in deciding
whether to locate new or expanded business activity in the United
States or in a low-tax foreign country.26 Moreover, the foreign tax
credit allows the United States to collect a residual tax on the foreign-
source income of U.S. residents when the foreign tax is less than the
U.S. tax. Not only does this benefit the U.S. fisc, it also affirms the
principle of ability-to-pay, which requires that the foreign-source
income of U.S. residents be included in the U.S. income tax base.27 In
contrast, the exemption or territorial approach provides an incentive to
locate business activities in low-tax countries, even in cases where a
business activity conducted there has a lower pretax return than an
equivalent U.S. business activity.28 In contrast, territoriality loses
residual tax revenue, stimulates the shifting of profits to low-tax
countries,29 and conflicts with the ability-to-pay principle by excluding
the foreign income of U.S. residents from the tax base."o
Nevertheless, the foreign tax credit has also been criticized
because (1) its prohibition against reimbursement for foreign taxes in
tax/transfer system can be a powerful policy tool to discriminate between deserving and
undeserving transfer program recipients."); Kingson, supra note 22, at 14 ("[The 1986 Tax
Reform Act's] foreign tax credit amendments can therefore be viewed as only foisting the
same sort of complexity on people more equipped to cope with it.").
26. See JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34115, REFORM OF U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TAxAION: ALTERNATIVES 5-7, 10-11 (2015); J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J.
Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Perspectives on the Worldwide vs. Ternitoial Taxation Debate, 125
TAX NOTES 1079, 1084-85 (2009) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Perspectives].
27. See Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY 98-99 (Jan. 17,
1977), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Blueprints-
1977.pdf; Benshalom, supra note 1, at 74-75.
28. See CBO, OPTIONS FOR TAXING, supra note 7, at 22-23; GRAVELLE, supra note 26,
at 5-6; MARK P KEIGHTLEY & JEFFREY M. STUPAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44013,
CORPORATE TAX BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (BEPS): AN EXAMINATION OF THE DATA
16 (2015); Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Perspectives, supa note 26, at 1084-85.
29. See KEIGHTLEY & STUPAK, supra note 28, at 17; see also Kimberly A. Clausing,
The Effect of Profit Shilbng on the Corporate Tax Base, 150 TAx NOTES 427 (2016) ("[T]he
revenue cost to the U.S. government from profit shifting ... was likely between $77 billion
and $111 billion per year by 2012.").
30. See Hugh J. Ault & David E Bradford, Taxing International Income:An Analysis
ofthe US. System andIts Economic Premises; in TAxATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 11,27
(Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990) ("[S]ince the source of income has no bearing on its
validity as a measure of ability to pay, the tax burden should be based on 'worldwide
income."'). For an explanation of how this principle applies to corporate income, see
Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fainess in International Taxation, supra note 2, at 318-27. See also
Joel Slemrod, Why'd You Have To Go and Make Things So Complicated., i TAx
SIMPLIFICATION 1, 7 (Chris Evans, Richard Krever & Peter Mellor eds., 2015) ("Any change
in the tax law in the apparent direction of simplification will also have some equity and
efficiency implications.").
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excess of US. tax on foreign-source income means that it does not
strictly conform to the economic standard of capital export
neutrality;" (2) it might encourage low-tax foreign countries to
plunder U.S. residual tax revenue by raising their rates of tax on US.
residents up to the US. rate;32 and (3) it does not provide U.S
taxpayers with an incentive to minimize their foreign tax liabilities so
that US. residual tax on their foreign income is maximized.3 Part II
of this Article deals with the relationship between the foreign tax
credit in a real worldwide system and capital export neutrality. Part
111 addresses the point that the foreign tax credit might motivate low-
tax foreign countries to appropriate U.S. residual tax revenue by
increasing their tax on income earned within their borders by U.S.
residents. Part IV discusses the possibility that the foreign tax credit
might make U.S. residents apathetic towards reducing their foreign tax
liabilities so long as those liabilities are not greater than the limitation
on the credit. In Part V we recognize that the foreign tax credit has an
important effect in addition to mitigating international double
taxation-it is a critical element in allocating the international income
tax base between residence countries and source countries. We then
evaluate the foreign tax credit as a tax base allocator in comparison to
an exemption for foreign-source income. In Part VI, we acknowledge
the necessity of a robust definition of corporate residence and preview
our forthcoming work on that topic. Part VII explains why the foreign
tax credit merits only two cheers in spite of its comparative virtues
that make it superior to all other approaches for mitigating double
taxation. The conclusion summarizes our analysis and findings.
31. See GRAVELLE, supm note 26, at 10-11; JOINT COMM., IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL
TAX REFORM, supra note 9, at 3; AuLT & ARNOLD, supa note 5 at 454-55; 1 NAT'L FOREIGN
TRADE COUNCL, THE NFTC FOREIGN INCOME PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY FOR THE
21sT CENTURY 5-6, 8 (2001) [hereinafter NFTC 1]; Ault & Bradford, supm note 30, at 40.
Capital export neutrality is an economic standard holding that taxation should be a
neutral factor in a taxpayer's choice between carrying on economic activity in the taxpayer's
residence country or in a foreign country. It is given effect in its purest form when the
taxpayer's residence country taxes each resident's worldwide income as it is earned and
provides the resident with an unlimited credit for foreign income taxes imposed on that
income. See GRAVELLE, supra note 26, at 5-6, 10-11; GusTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra
note 3, at 20.
32. See Stanley S. Surrey, Cwrent Issues ib the Taxation of Corpomte Foreign
Investment 56 COLUM. L. REv 815, 823 (1956). Surrey did not, however, endorse this
criticism.
33. See DANIEL N. SHAvIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 24 (2014); Alan
D. Viard, PPL: Exposig the Flaws of the Foreign Tax Credit 139 TAX NOTES 553, 561-62
(2013); see also Martin A. Sullivan, Shaviok FiRing US. International Taxation, 143 TAX
NOTEs 641 (2014) (providing a complimentary review of Professor Shaviro's position).
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II. THE IMPORTANCE, OR NOT, OF CAPITAL EXPORT NEUTRALITY
Some critics of real worldwide taxation assert that it is based
entirely on the economic standard of capital export neutrality.' This
has led some to imply that the foreign tax credit, which is a crucial
element of worldwide taxation, is incoherent because it is not fully
consistent with capital export neutrality." In this Part, we explain why
this criticism is mostly incorrect and, more importantly,
unilluminating.
The economic standard of capital export neutrality holds that a
business or investment activity should bear the same income tax
burden regardless of whether the activity takes place in the taxpayer's
residence country or in a foreign country." The standard's underlying
rationale is that its application makes income taxation a neutral factor
in deciding where to locate business or investment activity so that the
decision is based on a comparison of economic merits, thereby
contributing to greater worldwide efficiency and economic growth
than would be the case if tax considerations drove the choice of
location." Example 1 explores these points.
Example 1: USCo is a Delaware corporation whose shares are entirely
owned by U.S. residents. Its U.S. effective tax rate is 35%. USCo is
considering expanding its business. The location options are the United
States or either of two foreign countries-Lowtaxia and Hightaxia. If
the expansion occurs in the United States, the before-tax return will be
10%, and the effective tax rate will be 35%. If, on the other hand, the
expansion occurs through a Lowtaxia branch," the before-tax rate of
34. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, U.S. TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME:
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 51-52 (1992); NFTC 2, supra note 22, at 5-6; Mihir A. Desai, C.
Fritz Foley & James R. Hines Jr., Domestic Effects of the Foreign Activides of US
Multiationals, 1 AM. EcoN. J.: EcoN. POL'Y 181, 201 (2009).
35. SeeNFTC 1, supra note 31, at 5-6; Ault & Bradford, supra note 30, at 40.
36. See GRAVELLE, supra note 26, at 5-6, 10-11; JoINT COMM., IMPACT OF
INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM, supra note 9, at 57; GUSTAFSON, PERONI, & PUGH, supra note 3,
at 20. This means that foreign-source income should be subject to nondeferred U.S. taxation
to the same extent as U.S.-source income. See Kingson, supra note 22, at 16.
37. See GRAVELLE, supra note 26, at 5-6, 10-11; JOINT COMM., IMPACT OF
INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM, supra note 9, at 57-58; MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FOLLOW THE
MONEY: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TAxATION 94, 295 (2016) [hereinafter GRAETZ, FOLLOW
THE MONEY]; GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 3, at 20; Michael J. Graetz, The David
R. Tillinghast Lecture, Taxig International Income: Inadequate Pinciles, Outdated
Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAx L. REv 261, 270 (2001) [hereinafter Graetz,
Inadequate Pnnciples].
38. The assumption that USCo would use a branch structure simplifies the example
by eliminating deferral of U.S. income tax on USCo's foreign-source income. Example 1
could be revised to include deferral, along with additional facts, so that the ultimate outcome
would be unchanged. However, nothing would be gained from the increased complexity.
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return will be 9%, but the effective tax rate will be only 5%. However,
expansion through a Hightaxia branch will produce a 12% before-tax
return, and the effective tax rate will be 50%.
Purely from the standpoint of worldwide efficiency, the most
desirable outcome is for USCo to ignore the 50% tax in Hightaxia and
do its expansion there because the before-tax rate of return would be
12% (as compared to 10% in the United States).39 Worldwide
efficiency also requires USCo to forgo the attractive Lowtaxia 5% tax
because the before-tax rate of return there is only 9%. These are the
behaviors that capital export neutrality seeks to induce."
The U.S. system of current taxation of foreign branch income
coupled with a foreign tax credit would attain the correct capital
export neutrality result with respect to the Lowtaxia option because
there would be a 5% Lowtaxia levy plus a 30% U.S. residual tax after
the United States allowed a foreign tax credit for the Lowtaxia levy.
This sum would equal the 35% U.S. tax that would apply if the
expansion occurred in the United States.4' Thus, the U.S./Lowtaxia
rate differential would be neutralized. The after-tax return of a
Lowtaxia expansion would be 5.85%,42 while the after-tax return for a
U.S. expansion would be 6.5%.43 This after-tax comparison would
cause USCo's management to choose U.S. expansion with its 10%
before-tax return instead of Lowtaxia expansion which yields only 9%
before tax. This result is consistent with capital export neutrality."
However, as noted above,45 the preferred capital export neutrality
result would be for USCo to do the expansion in Hightaxia rather than
either Lowtaxia or the United States. This is so because a Hightaxia
expansion would yield a 12% before-tax return, which is greater than
the return in either Lowtaxia or the United States.46 This result would
be achieved if the United States reimbursed USCo for the 15
percentage points of tax by which the Hightaxia levy exceeds the U.S.
tax. The effective tax rate on the Hightaxia expansion income would
then be 35%,47 resulting in an after-tax return of 7.8%,48 which is
39. Pretax return is the standard metric for determining locational efficiency. See
JoINT COMM., IMPACT OF INTERNATIONALTAx REFORM, supra note 9, at 57-58.
40. See sources cited supm note 31.
41. 5%+(35%-5%)=35%.
42. 9% x (1 -. 35)= 5.85%.
43. 10% x (1 - .35) = 6.5%.
44. See sources cited supra note 31; Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Perspectives, supra note
26, at 1084-85.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
46. See sources cited supra note 31.
47. 50%-15%=35%.
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obviously higher than the after-tax return in either Lowtaxia (5.85%)
or the United States (6.5%). Faced with these comparisons USCo's
management would execute the expansion in Hightaxia, and capital
export neutrality would be upheld.
This will not happen though. Neither the United States nor,
apparently, any other country that uses the foreign tax credit will
explicitly reimburse its residents for foreign tax incurred in excess of
domestic tax.49 Specifically, in Example 1's Hightaxia scenario, the
U.S. foreign tax credit claimed against U.S. tax would be limited to
the 35% U.S. tax so that the effective tax rate on the Hightaxia
expansion income would be 50% (zero U.S. tax, after a credit for 35
percentage points of Hightaxia tax, plus the 50% Hightaxia levy).
This would leave the Hightaxia expansion with a 6% after-tax return"
compared with a 6.5% after-tax return in the United States.
Accordingly, USCo would forgo the Hightaxia 12% before-tax return
in favor of the U.S. 10% before-tax return. The efficiency goal of
capital export neutrality would be thwarted, and the limited foreign
tax credit would be the culprit.
For several reasons, however, this is not a tragedy. First, it is
doubtful that the worldwide efficiency goal of capital export
neutrality would be meaningfully furthered if the United States
48. 12% x (1 - .35) = 7.8%.
49. As stated by Professor Paul McDaniel:
A completely implemented CEN [capital export neutrality] policy would require
that the U.S. refund all foreign taxes in excess of the U.S. tax on foreign source
income. Such a rule, of course, would put U.S. revenues completely at the mercy
of foreign countries' tax rates. Neither the U.S. nor any other FTC [foreign tax
credit] country will accept or has accepted this result.
McDaniel, supm note 14, at 298.
In the real world, of course, USCo might execute half of the expansion in Lowtaxia and
half in Hightaxia. Under current U.S. law, the 15 percentage points of excess Hightaxia tax
could be deducted from ("cross-credited" against) the 30 percentage points of the U.S.
residual tax on the Lowtaxia income. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Wose than Exempion,
supra note 16, at 132-37. This would achieve the same result as a U.S. reimbursement of
USCo's excess Hightaxia tax and would make the Hightaxia expansion attractive after tax. To
avoid the need to construct a more complex version of Example 1, we have omitted the cross-
crediting scenario and given USCo an either/or choice between Lowtaxia and Hightaxia.
This does not affect the points made in the analysis. Under-allocation of expenses also can
result in crediting an amount in excess of an effective 35% rate. See supm note 13. Our
discussion assumes appropriate expense allocation rules.
50. 12% x (1 - .50) = 6%. Professor David Elkins has argued that after-tax returns
rather than pretax returns should be used for such comparisons. See David C. Elkins, The
Merits of Tax Competition h a Globalized Economy, 91 IND. L. 1 905, 928 (2016). This
appears to be a minority view. See JoiNT COMM., IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM,
supm note 9, at 57-58. We disagree with it because pretax returns are the better measure of
total economic production.
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unilaterally removed the limitation from its foreign tax credit, thus
reimbursing USCo in Example 1 for the 15 percentage points of
excess Hightaxia tax as well as reimbursing all other U.S. residents for
excess tax incurred as a result of doing business or investing in high-
tax countries. This is because most developed countries have adopted
territorial systems which exempt foreign-source business income
from domestic taxation so that for their residents, only foreign tax is
relevant with respect to their foreign-source income." Residents of
these countries would, therefore, have a strong incentive to
misallocate their capital by rejecting opportunities in countries like
Hightaxia and, instead, pursuing inferior rates of return in low-tax
countries where the low tax rate produces an attractive after-tax
return.5 In theory, this incentive might attract so much capital from
exemption countries to low-tax countries that pretax rates of return in
the latter will be driven down to a level that yields after-tax returns
equivalent to after-tax returns in high-tax countries.5 But this
equilibrium would be achieved only through what is, in terms of the
rationale of capital export neutrality, a misallocation of capital.
Because this misallocation is a consequence of the territorial systems
that exist in most of the developed world, it is probably too large to be
significantly corrected by the United States unilaterally changing to
an unlimited foreign tax credit.54
Second, Americans rightly have elected their members of
Congress to pursue policies that improve the well-being of Americans.
When U.S. welfare is enhanced by tax policies that increase
worldwide economic welfare, as economists generally believe to be
the case with respect to tax policies that are consistent with free
trade," then worldwide economic welfare is a laudable goal for U.S.
policymakers. But the welfare of the American people must be the
principal objective of U.S. tax policy."
51. See, e.g., CBO, OPTIONS FOR TAXING, supra note 7, at 5.
52. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Pespectives, spqra note 26, at 1084-85.
53. See Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 TAX L. REv. 99,
106-07, 106 n.27 (2011) [hereinafter Kleinbard, Lessons].
54. See generally SHAVIRO, supra note 33, at 127-29 (arguing that U.S. investors have
a limited capacity to shift global capital allocation).
55. See, eg., id. at 116; Paul R. McDaniel, Trade and Taxation, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
1621, 1625-26 (2001).
56. See GRAETz, FOLLOW THE MONEY, supra note 37, at 103; SHAvIRO, supm note 33,
at 108-09; Graetz, Inadequate Prnciples, supra note 37, at 279; Viard, supra note 33, at 564.
The analysis of U.S. welfare should be multifaceted and not be restricted solely to which
country receives the revenue. The public expenditure of another country may advance U.S.
welfare in numerous ways, including by providing security that also benefits the United
TULANE LAW REVIEW
In this light, it is important to recall that under international law,
the United States has an obligation to eliminate double taxation
resulting from its taxation of the foreign income of U.S. residents, but
the obligation does not extend beyond that. Thus, in Example 1, if
USCo, which is assumed to have a 35% U.S. effective tax rate, were
to execute its business expansion in Hightaxia and suffer a 50%
source country tax on its profits, the United States would fully satisfy
its international law duty by crediting 35 percentage points of the
Hightaxia levy against the U.S. tax on the Hightaxia profits. This
would totally offset the U.S. tax, thereby eliminating double taxation
because only the Hightaxia levy would be in place. Clearly, if the
United States goes beyond a credit for 35 percentage points of the
Hightaxia levy and reimburses USCo for the 15 percentage points of
excess Hightaxia tax, the United States is paying a subsidy to support
USCo's expansion in Hightaxia." Thus, when thinking about whether
the United States should fully support the capital export neutrality
principle by adopting an unlimited foreign tax credit, U.S.
policymakers should be primarily focused on the issue of whether
paying subsidies to U.S. multinationals to expand into low-tax foreign
countries furthers the well-being of the American people. When the
issue is framed in these terms, we are not aware of any empirical data
that would provide economic support for paying these subsidies."
States or by providing public goods that forestall excessive immigration of that country's
residents to the United States.
57. See JOINT COMM., IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM, supm note 9, at 65-
66; Robert J. Peroni, Back to the Futue: A Path to Progressive Reform of the US.
International Income Tax Rules, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv 975, 978 (1997); see also DANIEL N.
SHAvIRo, DECODING THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX 117 (2009) (explaining how foreign tax credits
can be viewed as an "aggressive trade subsidy for U.S. companies"); Daniel J. Frisch, The
Economics ofInternational Tax Pobiy Some Old and New Approaches, 47 TAX NorES 58 1,583 (1990); Kingson, suple note 22, at 56.
58. Is the limited U.S. foreign credit also a subsidy in the form of a tax expenditure?
We believe that the answer is no. Deciding whether to apply the tax expenditure label is not
an end in itself The object is to identify tax features that distort taxpayer behavior and then
to subject those features to a broadly defined cost-benefit analysis. See generally I Clifton
Fleming, Jr. & Robert I Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis and Its
International Dimension, 27 VA. TAX REv. 437 (2008) [hereinafter Fleming & Peroni,
Reinvigomting Tax Expenditure Analysis] (explaining the underlying rationale of tax
expenditure analysis). The purpose of the foreign tax credit is not to distort behavior.
Instead, its purpose is to prevent distortion by ensuring that foreign-source income bears a
total U.S. and foreign tax that is no less than the U.S. tax that would apply to a similar amount
of domestic income. Some would argue that because of the U.S. foreign tax credit limitation,
there is a distortion if the foreign tax exceeds the U.S. tax and that, in such a case, the foreign
tax credit functions as a tax penalty or negative tax expenditure. In our view, however, the
distortion or penalty results from the high tax in the foreign system, not the U.S. foreign tax
credit limitation. Seeing no U.S.-caused distortion, we do not view a limited foreign tax
14 [Vol. 91:1
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An additional reason to be dubious about replacing the limited
U.S. foreign tax credit with an unlimited credit is that it might expose
the U.S. Treasury to raids by other countries. As the Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) has observed:
[P]roviding an unlimited tax credit for foreign income and withholding
tax would create incentives for capital importing countries to increase
their host country tax burden, as this would increase host country
revenues without affecting the combined host/home country tax burden
on inbound FDI [foreign direct investment]. Thus foreign tax credit
limitations are in order to avoid pure transfers of tax revenue from
home to host countries. .. .
Accordingly, a U.S. foreign tax credit that is limited to the U.S.
tax on foreign-source income represents a prudential approach that
appropriately protects the fisc." The issue of whether less developed
foreign countries should be allowed to appropriate some or all of the
U.S. tax base will be discussed further in Part V
As shown with respect to Lowtaxia in Example 1, capital export
neutrality produces correct results with respect to the decision by a
U.S. resident to invest, or not, in a low-tax foreign country because it
inhibits U.S. residents from pursuing opportunities that have lower
pretax rates of return than those available at home. However, the
preceding analysis indicates that capital export neutrality, which calls
for an unlimited foreign tax credit, is not a useful policy guide with
respect to a U.S. resident's decision on whether or not to invest in
high-tax foreign countries. In that setting, capital export neutrality is
credit as either a tax expenditure or a negative tax expenditure or tax penalty. For a contrary
view, see Patrick Driessen, Would Teitoih? Be a Tax Expenditur?, 146 TAx NOTES 647,
651 (2015). But even if the limited foreign tax credit is a tax expenditure, it passes a cost-
benefit analysis for the reasons given in this Article.
59. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Tax Effects on Foreign Direct
Investment: Recent Evidence and Policy Analysis, at 99, Tax Policy Studies No. 17 (2007),
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-policy/3986 6 1 5 5 .pdf; see also JOINT COMM., IMPACT OF
INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM, supra note 9, at 65-66 (stating that a credit limitation is an
important protective safeguard).
60. See JANE G. GRAVELLE & DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL34494, THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT'S INTEREST ALLOCATION RuLES 5 (2008) ("[T]he
purpose of the foreign tax credit limit is not to ensure the efficient allocation of resources;
rather, it is concerned with protecting the U.S. tax base."); JOINT COMM., IMPACT OF
INTERNATIONAL TAx REFORM, supra note 9, at 13 ("The foreign tax credit ... limit is intended
to ensure that the credit serves its purpose of mitigating double taxation of foreign-source
income without offsetting the U.S. tax on U.S.-source income.").
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an incomplete principle. Thus, there is little reason to criticize the
U.S. foreign tax credit for deviating from it."
III. THE POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION OF THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT TO
MORE AGGRESSIVE SOURCE TAXATION
A. Why Not a Deduction Instead ofa Credit?
As just indicated in Part H, the United States has an
understandable motivation for refusing to give a credit for foreign
income tax payments in excess of the U.S. tax on the relevant income.
To do otherwise would allow high-tax foreign countries to tax U.S.
residents at rates in excess of the applicable U.S. rate without
suffering any adverse consequences because the U.S. residents would
be reimbursed by the credit for the excess tax.62 Thus, the excess
foreign tax would effectively be paid with U.S. Treasury funds.
A moment's thought tells us that the same point can be made
with respect to foreign income tax that does not exceed the U.S.
limitation and is, therefore, fully creditable. The credit causes a
61. See JOINT COMM., IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM, supra note 9, at 65("The only 'fault' of the foreign tax credit limitation in the context of capital export neutrality
is that subsidies are not provided in the form of foreign tax credits in excess of domestic tax
liability."). In earlier work, we have advocated real worldwide or full inclusion U.S.
taxation-a regime that applies the U.S. income tax to foreign-source income as it is earned
but that allows a credit, without significant cross-crediting, for any foreign tax on that income
up to the level of the U.S. tax. See, e.g., Fleming, Peroni & Shay, FormularyAppordonmen4
supra note 7, at 18-30; Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Perspecdves, supm note 26, at 1082-87,1091-1106. Some critics characterize such a system as "commonly justified by appeal to the
principle of capital export neutrality." Desai, Foley & Hines, supta note 34, at 201. Although
we conclude that of the various economic theories for structuring the taxation of international
income, capital export neutrality, in its purest form, comes closest to prescribing the correct
result, we also conclude that it is not completely satisfactory, particularly because it supports
an unlimited foreign tax credit. See also IMF, supra note 3, at 72-73 (stating that capital
export neutrality and other neutrality standards "provide only limited guidance . .. and indeed
are rarely invoked in policy discussions"). Instead, our strong preference for real worldwide
taxation is primarily driven by a desire to avoid the tax subsidies and distorted business and
investment behavior that result from other approaches to international income taxation.
Neutrality analysis can be helpful in identifying such subsidies and distortions. See Fadi
Shaheen, On Fixing US Internatonal Taxadon, 9 JERUSALEM REV LEGAL STUD. 125, 128(2014) ("But neutrality norms remain invaluable tools for understanding and assessing the
behavioral responses to and distortionary effects of taxation at the different margins. With
these tools, we understand better today how different tax systems may affect saving,
investment locations, and ownership patterns."); David A. Weisbach, The Use ofNeutralites
in Internadonal Tax Polcy, 68 NAT'L TAX J. 635, 648 (2015) ("[A] decision to tax capital
income means that we knowingly are distorting investment choices so the question is how
best to do that, given the relevant goals and administrative concerns.").
62. See JOINT COMM., IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM, supm note 9, at 65-
66.
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dollar-for-dollar surrender of U.S. tax revenue, which reimburses the
U.S. resident and effectively satisfies the foreign tax liability. If the
United States does not accept that result to the extent of foreign tax
payments in excess of the applicable US. domestic tax, why does it
acquiesce with respect to foreign tax payments that come within this
limit? Why does the United States not treat foreign income tax
payments as non-creditable but deductible business expenses? Doing
so would give recognition to the often recited mantra by U.S.
multinationals that taxes are a business cost like any other," and the
revenue loss to the Treasury would be greatly reduced, at least before
dynamic effects are taken into account. A superficial answer to this
question is that the bilateral income tax treaties between the United
States and its major trading partners require the United States to give
a credit rather than a deduction for income taxes paid to its treaty
partners.'
But more needs to be said. There is broad agreement that free
trade benefits the United States and that obstacles to free trade should
be mitigated." Allowing only a deduction for U.S. residents' foreign
tax payments would discourage international trade because, according
63. See Amy S. Elliott, Tech Companies Defend International Tax Structures, 140
TAX NOTEs 1530 (2013) ("Tax is a cost, like anything else, that we'd like to minimize so we
can have more earnings to invest in the business.") (statement of the tax director of Adobe
Systems, Inc.) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also SHAVIRO, supm note 33, at 9
("[W]hen U.S. people pay foreign taxes, it truly is just an expense from our standpoint, no
less than when they pay foreign fuel bills or labor costs, given that we don't get the money.").
64. See 2016 U.S. MODEL, supra note 9, art. 23. Another response is that a tax is just
a business cost only in the eyes of the business taxpayer. Unlike that taxpayer's other
expenses, taxes are used to pay for public goods that generally would not be supplied, or
would not be supplied at a socially acceptable price and amount, by the private sector. In that
sense, taxes are not just another expense but involve a broader social responsibility than the
economic relationship with vendors supplying goods and services.
65. See KEIGHTLEY & STUPAK, supra note 28, at 16; The Pros and Cons ofPursuing
Free-Trade Agreements, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE 2-3 (July 31, 2003), www.cbo.gov/sites/
default/files/108th-congress-2003-2004/reports/07-31tradebrief.pdf; HARRY G. BRAINARD,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 5-6, 129, 193 (1954); McDaniel, supra note
55, at 1625-26; Joel B. Slemrod, Free Tmde Taxation and Protectionist Taxation, 2 INT'LTAX
& PUB. FIN. 471, 472 (1995); see also The Effects ofLiberaizing WorldAgricultural Trade: A
Survey, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE viii, 11-12 (Dec. 2005), www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
109th-congress-2005-2006/reports/12-01-tradelib.pdf (finding studies almost unanimously
conclude that the United States would benefit from agricultural free trade); The Effects of
NAFTA on US.-Mexican Tade and GDP, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE ix, xiv, 21-22 (May 2003),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/108th-congress-2003-2004/reports/reportO.pdf
(finding that because Canada, Mexico, and the United States had previously made substantial
progress in eliminating trade barriers among themselves, the North American Free Trade
Agreement had only a small effect on U.S. GDP and that effect was positive). We recognize
that not everyone benefits from free trade and strong measures are needed to mitigate harms
to individuals adversely affected by trade.
TULANE LA WRE VIEW
to familiar tax math, the U.S. tax would be reduced only by an amount
equal to each taxpayer's U.S. marginal rate multiplied by the foreign
tax." The result would be partial double taxation that would be a
barrier to international trade." Example 2 illustrates this point.
Example 2: Assume that USCo's marginal U.S. tax rate is 35% and that
it could earn $100 in Country X and pay a $20 Country X tax thereon
or earn the same amount in the United States. If the $20 were credited
against the $35 U.S. tax, the U.S. tax would be reduced by $20 to $15,
and the U.S. and Country X taxes would add up to $35 so that USCo
would have the same $65 after-tax result from earning the $100 in
either Country X or the United States. Taxes would be a neutral factor
in USCo's decision to earn income at home or abroad. If, however, only
a deduction were allowed for the $20 Country X tax, the reduction in
U.S. tax would be merely $7." This would leave a U.S. tax of $28."
The U.S. and Country X taxes would then add up to $48,"0 and USCo's
after-tax income would be only $52" instead of the $65 after-tax
income from U.S. activity. USCo would be deterred from expanding
into Country X.
Moreover, if the United States terminated or renegotiated all of
its treaties so that it was free to treat foreign income taxes as
deductible rather than creditable costs, it is surely the case that its
trading partners would seek changes that commensurately benefit
their fiscs, and international trade would be adversely affected. For
these reasons, it is sensible for the United States to accept the revenue
loss resulting from allowing a credit for foreign income taxes that do
not exceed U.S. tax on the relevant income.
The preceding discussion has focused entirely on active business
income and the impact of taxation on deciding whether to locate
business activity in the residence country or in a low-tax foreign
country. The argument has been made that this type of analysis is
generally inapposite with respect to passive income and that the
proper approach is for residence countries generally to allow only a
66. See JOSEPH M. DODGE, J. CLIFTON FLEMING, JR. & ROBERT J. PERONI, FEDERAL
INCOME TAx: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND POLICY 91-92 (4th ed. 2012).
67. See JoINT COMM., IMwACT OF INTERNATiONAL TAx REFORM, supm note 9, at 59-
60.
68. $20 x 35%= $7.
69. $35 - $7 = $28.
70. $28 U.S. tax + $20 Country X tax = $48.
71. $100- $48= $52.
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deduction for foreign income taxes imposed on their residents' foreign
passive income.7
In this Article, we are primarily concerned with the relationship
of the foreign tax credit to the distinction between worldwide taxation
versus territorial taxation. Speaking broadly, territorial systems
eliminate this distinction with respect to passive income by imposing
worldwide taxation with a foreign tax credit on such income."
Consequently, this Article will focus on the foreign tax credit in the
context of active business income. In that context, worldwide taxation
with a foreign tax credit is the preferred approach if the worldwide
system eliminates deferral and cross-crediting.
B. Expanded Source Taxation
This, however, does not end the debate. It has been suggested
that U.S. willingness to accept the revenue cost of the foreign tax
credit might cause other countries to increase their taxation of U.S.
residents up to the credit limitation.74 The rationale for their doing so
would be that the credit would effectively place the enlarged foreign
tax burden on the U.S. Treasury so that the increased foreign tax
would not impact U.S. residents and would not deter them from doing
business or investing in the taxing countries. The principal ways in
which foreign countries could implement this strategy would be to
raise their source tax rates up to the U.S. foreign tax credit limitation"
or to indirectly achieve the same result by aggressively expanding
their respective source tax bases.
72. See GRAETZ, FOLLOW THE MONEY, supra note 37, at 305-11; Deborah A. Geier,
Some Thoughts on the Incidence ofForeign Taxes, 87 TAx NoTEs 541, 551 (2000); Michael J.
Graetz & Itai Grinberg, Taxing International Portfolio Income, 56 TAx L. REv 537, 568-74
(2003).
73. See JorNT CoMM., BACKGROUND AND ISSUES, supra note 8, at 8.
74. See Surrey, supm note 32, at 823; see also Allison Christians, What the Baucus
Plan Reveals About Tax Competidon, 72 TAx NOrES INT'L 1113, 1115 (2013) (stating that if
the United States adopted real worldwide taxation, the U.S. tax rate on income earned by
U.S.-owned foreign subsidiaries would increase and the tax rate imposed by other countries
could increase to match the residual U.S. rate because other countries would rely on the
foreign tax credit to "stabilize the new status quo"); Ajay Gupta, US. Crehtability and
Foreign Environmental Levies, 80 TAx Noms INT'L 134 (2015) ("The United States ...
offers a foreign tax credit .... As a result, foreign jurisdictions heavily dependent on inflows
of U.S. capital no longer have to worry about bidding up after-tax returns on foreign
investment by lowering their own tax rates.").
75. See Li, supra note 1, at 127 ("[I]f the residence country adopts a credit system
and limits the credit to the amount of domestic tax otherwise payable, it implicitly allows the
source country to tax income at the 'soak-up' rate-that is, a rate equal to that in the
residence country.").
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1. Increased Source Tax Rates
There are several reasons why the scenario of increased source
tax rates is unlikely. First, the use of low source tax rates as a
competitive strategy to attract foreign investment from many countries
in addition to the United States has become widespread, even in
developed economies." This competition would restrain a foreign
country from increasing its rates solely to exploit the U.S. foreign tax
credit. Thus, raising source tax rates to take advantage of the U.S.
foreign tax credit would not be a likely strategy, at least in a country
where U.S. investment was not dominant, unless the increases were
confined to income earned by U.S. residents and their controlled
foreign corporations.
Such a discriminatory rate strategy would, however, collide with
the fact that the bilateral income tax treaties between the United States
and its major trading partners generally prohibit the treaty partners
from taxing the business income of U.S. residents more burdensomely
than the partners tax their own residents." Accordingly, a low-tax
treaty partner could not raise its tax rate on U.S. residents in order to
exploit the U.S. foreign tax credit unless it also applied the same tax
burden to its own residents. The likelihood of political opposition is
obvious.
In addition, the regulations provide that a foreign tax is
creditable for purposes of the U.S. foreign tax credit "only to the
extent that liability for the foreign tax is not dependent (by its terms or
otherwise) on the availability of a credit for the foreign tax against
76. See generally STAFF OF JoINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-51-15, PRESENT LAW
AND SELECTED POLICY ISSUES IN THE U.S. TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER INCOME 38-47 (2015)
[hereinafter JOINT COMM., TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER INCOME] (providing an assessment of
the competitiveness of the U.S. tax system within the larger global economy); Org. for Econ.
Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Harmfid Tax Compeddon: An Emeiging Global Issue
(1998), http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/44430243.pdf; Mindy Herzfeld, The UK
Embraces Tax Compeddon and BEPS, 75 TAX NOTES INT'L 85 (2014).
77. For example, the 2016 U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty provides:
Enterprises of a Contracting State, the capital of which is wholly or partly owned
or controlled, directly or indirectly, by one or more residents of the other
Contracting State, shall not be subjected in the first-mentioned Contracting State to
any taxation or any requirement connected therewith that is more burdensome than
the taxation and connected requirements to which other similar enterprises of the
first-mentioned Contracting State are or may be subjected.
2016 U.S. MODEL, supa note 9, art. 24. para. 5.
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income tax liability to another country."" The regulations give the
following example:
Country X imposes a tax on the receipt of royalties from sources in
country X by nonresidents of country X. The tax is 15 percent of the
gross amount of such royalties unless the recipient is a resident of the
United States or of country A, B, C, or D, in which case the tax is 20
percent of the gross amount of such royalties. Like the United States,
each of countries A, B, C, and D allows its residents a credit against the
income tax otherwise payable to it for income taxes paid to other
countries. Because the 20 percent rate applies only to residents of
countries which allow a credit for taxes paid to other countries and the
15 percent rate applies to residents of countries which do not allow such
a credit, one-fourth of the country X tax would not be imposed on
residents of the United States but for the availability of such a credit.
Accordingly, one-fourth of the country X tax imposed on residents of
the United States who receive royalties from sources in country X is
dependent on the availability of a credit for the country X tax against
income tax liability to another country."
Thus, a low-tax country could not raise its corporate income tax
rate on U.S. residents so as to take full advantage of the U.S. foreign
tax credit limitation unless it was willing to apply the same rate to
residents of other countries. Most of these other countries employ
territorial systems that provide an exemption for active foreign
business income, rather than a foreign tax credit. Consequently, if a
low-tax source country increased its source tax across the board, the
impact on residents of territorial countries would be fully borne by
those residents without any incremental assistance from a foreign tax
credit that reflected the increased source country tax. The obvious
negative effect on the ability of the source country to attract equity
capital investment from the large number of territorial countries
should, in the present environment of tax competition, discourage
source countries from going down this road.
This issue, however, has a converse-the possibility that so long
as a foreign country's tax burden does not exceed the amount of the
available US. foreign tax credit, US. residents will not undertake the
costs of the tax planning necessary to lawfully minimize the foreign
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(c)(1) (2006); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.903-1(b)(2) (applying
the soak-up tax rule to "in lieu of" taxes under I.R.C. § 903). Foreign taxes for which
liability is dependent on the availability of a foreign tax credit are often called "soak-up
taxes" and these regulations disallow any foreign tax credit to the extent that a foreign tax is a
soak-up tax. See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 3, at 331-33.
79. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(c)(2), ex. 1.
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tax, with the result that the United States will lose residual tax
revenue. We will discuss that topic in Part IV
2. Aggressive Expansion of Source Tax Bases: The Effect of BEPS
In principle, a foreign country that does not wish to raise its
source tax rate can leave its rate unchanged but enlarge its source tax
base sufficiently to produce the same revenue increase as a higher tax
rate. In recent years, some countries have employed this tactic by
intensifying the enforcement of their transfer pricing rules."o Even
more recently, the OECD's BEPS initiative"' has suggested that
countries should strengthen their source tax regimes by expanding the
permanent establishment concept, increasing the effectiveness of
transfer pricing rules, and limiting deductions for payments of
interest, royalties, and services fees to foreign related parties (earnings
stripping payments).82 Indeed, the United Kingdom has now acted
unilaterally to enhance its source tax base by effectively enlarging its
80. See, e.g., Archana Sarda Mody, Emerging Trends in Indian TiansferPnicing, 71
TAX NCOrES INT'L 633 (2013).
81. At the request of the G-20 nations, the OECD undertook a project to address the
damage to national tax bases made by base erosion and profit shifting, commonly referred to
by the acronym of BEPS. The object of the BEPS project was to generate a set of tax-base-
protection proposals. SeeYariv Brauner, What the BEPS, 16 FLA. TAX REv. 55, 58 (2014);
Sol Picciotto, Can the OECD Mend the International Tax System. 71 TAX NoTEs INT'L
1105, 1105 (2013). For data regarding the size of the profit shifting concern that was targeted
by the BEPS project, see KEIGHTLEY & STUPAK, supra note 28, at 10-13 (stating that IMF
data shows that the ten largest national economies in the world have an average inbound
foreign direct investment position equal to 25% of GDP while the ten countries that are most
popular foreign direct investment destinations have an average inbound foreign direct
investment position equal to 961% of GDP); Francis Weyzig, Stil Broken: Governments
Must Do More To Fix the International Corporate Tax System, OXFAM INT'L 5 (Nov. 2015),
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfaam.org/files/file attachments/bn-still-broken-corporate-
tax-1011 15-embargo-en.pdf ("[I]n 2012, US multinationals shifted between $500 and
$700bn in profits from countries where their real economic activities took place to countries
where lower effective tax rates apply.").
82. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], OECD/G20 Base Erosion
and Profit Shihig Project Explanatory Statemen4 at 7-8, 14-16 (2015), https://www.oecd.
org/ctp/beps-explanatory-statement-2015.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Explanatory Statement];
Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit
Shiing, at 16-17, 19-20 (2013), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf [hereinafter
OECD, Action Plan]; see also T. Timothy Tuerff, David Ware, Ronald D. Dickel & Michael P
Reilly, Practical Implementation of the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shanng (BEPS)
Action Plan, TAXES-TAx MAG., June 2015, at 107, 110 ("We're already ... having
countries, mainly in Asia, assert PE status solely based on our marketing activities. So, we're
already seeing it. I mean, they're not waiting for this to be concluded at the OECD project
level."). For our recent suggestions regarding the earnings stripping problem, see J. Clifton
Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Getthig Serious About Cross-Border
Earngs Sipping: Establishing anAnalyticalFraeworl 93 N.C. L. REv. 673 (2015).
2016] TWO CHEERS FOR THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT
concept of permanent establishment,83 and Australia has taken similar
action."
To the extent that foreign countries collect more creditable
source tax from U.S. residents, the United States must, subject to its
foreign tax credit limitation, grant larger foreign tax credits and
collect less residual tax. Thus, it is no surprise that the United States
has expressed concerns about the source tax expansion aspects of the
BEPS project."
While these matters obviously concern the United States, it is
unlikely that they are caused to any extent by the existence of the U.S.
foreign tax credit. Instead, the developments mentioned above are
driven by the desires of other countries to protect their source tax
bases from erosion through aggressive transfer pricing and through
inbound sales arrangements that exploit the limitations of the
permanent establishment concept." To the extent that U.S. law has
had any effect, the effect principally has come from the U.S.
disregarded entity rules," which enhance the capacity of U.S.
multinationals to erode foreign source tax bases by moving income
from high-tax foreign countries to low-tax foreign intermediary
jurisdictions." In this context, the U.S. foreign tax credit is not a
significant factor in actions by foreign countries.
83. Effective April 1, 2015, the United Kingdom adopted a "diverted profits tax." In
general, this new regime imposes a 25% tax on profits that would have been earned through a
U.K. permanent establishment if its existence had not been avoided by successfully exploiting
limitations in the definition of permanent establishment. See Karen Hughes, H. Todd Miller,
Rupert Shiers & Christine Lane, The UK. Diverted Profits Tax, J. TAX'N, July 2015, at 37,
39; Sol Picciotto, The UK & Diverted Profits Tax: An Admission ofDefeat or a Pre-Emptive
Strike., 77 TAx NoTEs INT'L 239 (2015); Marie Sapirie, Diverted Profits Tax Undermines
BEPS Consensus, 146 TAX NOTES 301 (2015); Philip Wagman, The UK Diverted Profits
Tax: Selected US. Tax Considerations, 147 TAX NOTES 1413 (2015).
84. See Ryan Finley, Diverted Profits Tax Proposal Would Strengthen ATO Position,
82 TAX NOTES INT'L 535 (2016); Mindy Herzfeld, Different Ways To Deem a PE, 79 TAx
NorEs INT'L 289 (2015); Ben Lannan, Australian BudgetMeasuresAhgn with BEPSProjec4
79 TAX NoTEs INT'L 761 (2015); Kristen A. Parillo, Australia Antiavoidance Bill Taigets
Multinationals, 79 TAx NOTEs INT'L 912 (2015).
85. See Ryan Finley, Stack Gives US. Penspective on BEPS Recommendations, 149
TAX NoTEs 354 (2015); Robert B. Stack, Stack Thscusses the Progress and Future ofBEPS,
147 TAX NGUES 1593 (2015). For a heated critique of the U.S. response to BEPS, see Ajay
Gupta, The US. and BEPS--Retum of the Big Bad Bully, 79 TAx NoTES INT'L 563, 563-64
(2015).
86. See OECD, Explanatory Statement supra note 82, at 7-8; OECD, Action Plan,
supma note 82, at 15-17, 19-21.
87. SeeTreas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2) (2006).
88. See Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 17, at 727-37; Bret Wells & Cym
Lowell, Tax Base Erosion and Homeless Income: Collection at Source Is the Linchpin, 65
TAX L. REV. 535 (2012); see also Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni,
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Of course, as noted above, some have expressed concerns that
actions by foreign countries to collect more source tax from U.S.
residents will result in the United States allowing larger foreign tax
credits and suffering lower tax collections from its residents, even if
the U.S. foreign tax credit is not an animating cause behind the
foreign behavior.89 The implicit argument seems to be that foreign
income accumulated offshore in controlled foreign corporations will
eventually be repatriated to the United States, at which time the
United States will collect a tax that will be greatly diminished if
increased foreign source taxes generate large U.S. foreign tax credits.
In the context of the present U.S. system, there are several reasons
why this concern is exaggerated.
First, a significant amount of this foreign income has likely been
returned to the United States' in the form of investments that are
freed from repatriation tax by loopholes in § 956 of the Subpart F
regime." To this extent, the potential residual tax with respect to
unrepatriated earnings is unlikely to be materially affected by
Designig a 21st Century Corpoate Tax-An Advance US MAnumum Tax on Foreinl
Income and Other Measures to Protect the Base, 17 FLA. TAX REv. 669, 690-92 (2015)
[hereinafter Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Designig a 21st Century Corporate Tax].
89. See Heaing on the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shiding Project Before the
Subcomm. on Tax Pol'y of the H Comm. on Ways & Means, 114th Cong. 10 (2015)
(statement of Barbara M. Angus) ("[T]he foreign tax credit regime that is part of the current
U.S. worldwide tax system means that the cost of increased foreign taxes on U.S.-based
companies will be borne in part by the U.S. fisc through reduced residual U.S. tax when
foreign earnings are repatriated."); National Foreign Thade Council Before the Subcomm. on
Tax Pol'y ofthe H Comm. on Ways & Means, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Catherine
Schultz, Vice President for Tax Pol'y, Nat'l Foreign Trade Council) ("As other governments
increase taxes on U.S. multinational companies, the U.S. will provide Foreign Tax Credits to
those companies to offset double taxation on the same income. As the number of Foreign Tax
Credits increases, we will see more base erosion-but this time, it will be the U.S. base that is
being eroded.").
90. See Stephen E. Shay, The Truthhiess of 'Eockout': A Review of What We Know,
146TAXNoTEs 1393, 1395 (2015).
91. See l.R.C. § 956(c)(2)(A),(F) (2012) (permitting nontaxable repatriations made in
the form of deposits in U.S. banks, purchases of debt obligations of the U.S. government and
of unrelated domestic corporations, and purchases of stock of unrelated domestic
corporations). See genemlly GusTAFsoN, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 3, at 587-89 (defining
U.S. property and discussing exclusions to the definition of U.S. property for taxation
purposes and requirements for banks and corporations to treat investments in property as
excluded from taxation under § 956); 1 KuNrz & PERONI, supra note 5, ¶ B3.06[2] (same). In
other words, many of the untaxed offshore profits are not really being held offshore. See
David Kocieniewski, Why Microsoaft, with $100 Billion, Wants a Loan for LhikedIn,
BLOOMBERG (June 13, 2016), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-13/why-
microsoft-with-100-billion-is-borrowing-to-buy-linkedin ("In Microsoft's most recent
quarterly report, the company reported $102.8 billion in untaxed profits controlled by its
offshore subsidiaries, 81 percent of which was held in U.S. government securities.").
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additional foreign taxes and related U.S. credits resulting from law
changes prompted by the BEPS recommendations.
Second, much of the foreign income that remains offshore in
controlled foreign corporations has been designated as indefinitely
reinvested for financial accounting purposes so that taxable
repatriation is not likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future.92
Moreover, when taxable repatriation does occur, the U.S. residual tax
may be mitigated by planning to take advantage of the liberal cross-
crediting of foreign taxes on other income permitted by the present
version of the U.S. foreign tax credit limitation.93 Therefore, the
revenue that would be jeopardized by larger foreign tax credits is
comparatively small. For these reasons, there seems to be little cause
for concern that expanded foreign source tax bases will result in a
meaningful revenue loss to the United States under its present
international income tax system.
If the United States were, however, to adopt a real worldwide
income tax regime that reached the foreign-source income of U.S.
residents as it was earned,94 significant amounts of revenue would be
exposed to reduction by foreign tax credits resulting from expanded
foreign source tax regimes." Nevertheless, so long as the foreign
measures are permitted by the U.S. bilateral treaty network," or by
international law" in the case of countries outside that network, the
92. See Lee A. Sheppard, Debunking the Overseas Cash Meme, 147 TAX NOTES 847
(2015).
93. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse than Exemption, supra note 16, at 132-37.
The foreign tax credit limitation was substantially weakened in the American Jobs Creation
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 404, 118 Stat. 1418, 1494-97. For a critique and
discussion of this weakening, see GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 3, at 419-23.
94. See Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, Getting Serious
About CutingDeferial of US Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REv 455, 508-
12 (1999) (describing a proposal for a real worldwide system); see also Fleming, Peroni &
Shay, Formulaiy Apportionment supma note 7, at 18-20 (describing elements of a real
worldwide system).
95. See STAFF OF JOINT CoMM. ON TAxATION, JCX-141R-15, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL
TAX EXPENDrrURES FOR FIscAL YEARS 2015-2019, at 29 (2015) (estimating a $563.6 billion
revenue loss over the 2015-2019 period from deferral of U.S. tax on active foreign income).
96. For discussion of the treaty compatibility of the U.K. and Australian permanent
establishment enhancing initiatives, discussed at text accompanying supm notes 83-84, see
Herzfeld, supra note 84, at 290-91; Hughes, Miller, Shiers & Lane, supra note 83, at 40;
Sapirie, supra note 83, at 303-04; Wagman, supra note 83, at 1428-3 1.
97. Customary international law does not require that countries use the permanent
establishment concept as the jurisdictional threshold for imposing source tax on business
income. See Sch6n, supra note 1, at 100. Indeed, the United States uses the lower threshold
of "trade or business" when a treaty is not applicable. SeeI.R.C. § § 871(b), 882(a) (2012).
25
TULANE LAWREVIEW
United States is in no position to object and, indeed, is free to employ
similar measures in its own interest.
More importantly, if the United States were to eliminate or
restrict its foreign tax credit in response to the negative effects on its
residence taxation regime that might flow from the permissible source
tax enhancement efforts of foreign countries, the U.S. conduct would
constitute a breach of treaty obligations." Such a breach, in turn,
could engender strategic foreign responses that would make this
approach inadvisable.
In summary, the present and prospective efforts by foreign
countries to strengthen their source tax regimes do not cast serious
doubt on the soundness of the foreign tax credit as an approach to
relieving international double taxation. In addition, so long as a U.S.
residual tax remains to be collected after allowing a credit for foreign
source tax, the U.S. fisc is better off than it would be if the United
States moved to a territorial system and totally surrendered its claim
to residual tax.
IV. MINIMIZING FOREIGN TAXES
A. Introduction
The foreign tax credit causes each dollar of creditable foreign
income tax liability to reduce the U.S. residual tax on foreign income
up to the credit limit. Some foreign tax credit critics regard this as
problematic because higher foreign tax liabilities mean less residual
tax collected by the United States. The U.S. interest, so the argument
goes, lies in having its residents engage in planning steps that
minimize their foreign tax liabilities and maximize their U.S. residual
tax payments." The foreign tax credit is regarded by these critics as
seriously flawed because its allowance of an equal reduction in U.S.
tax for each dollar of foreign tax liability, up to the limitation, is said
to make U.S. taxpayers unmotivated to execute foreign tax
minimization strategies when the effective foreign tax rate does not
exceed the taxpayer's effective U.S. tax rate." Example 3 illustrates
this point.
Example 3: AmeriCo is a Delaware corporation that has a 35% U.S.
effective income tax rate. It carries on business in Country A where its
effective income tax rate is 34%. Assuming that the Country A tax is
98. See2016 U.S. MODEL, supra note 9, art. 23.
99. See sources cited supm note 33.
100. See sources cited supra note 33.
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creditable for U.S. purposes, every dollar of Country A tax that is paid
will cause an offsetting dollar of reduction in U.S. tax. On the other
hand, every dollar of Country A tax saved by AmeriCo through tax
planning will reduce AmeriCo's foreign tax credit by one dollar and
thereby increase AmeriCo's liability for U.S. residual tax by one dollar.
Given those facts, it makes no sense, so the argument goes, for
AmeriCo to incur tax planning costs to lawfully minimize its Country A
tax, and AmeriCo will pay the full 34% Country A tax rather than
create U.S. residual tax liability by taking steps to reduce the foreign
tax.
Of course, if the United States reduces its corporate tax rate to a
level comparable to that of most developed countries, there will be no
meaningful U.S. residual tax except with respect to tax haven income.
Thus, this point will lose its significance because minimization of low
tax haven taxes is immaterial. However, this point should be
evaluated in the context of the present 35% maximum U.S. statutory
corporate income tax rate. To do so, it is necessary to think carefully
about the extent of the foreign tax minimization opportunities that
might be forgone because of the foreign tax credit. Under the present
U.S. international income tax system that allows deferral of active
foreign income and virtually unlimited cross-crediting, the largest,
most transactionally complex, and expensive opportunity for reducing
foreign taxes lies in creating stateless or homeless income." Example
4 illustrates this well-known technique in simplified terms.
B. Stateless/Homeless Income
The following simplified example illustrates the stateless/
homeless income concept.
Example 4: USCorp, a Delaware corporation subject to a U.S. effective
tax rate of 35%, is a multinational corporation (MNC) that owns all the
stock of EuroSub, a foreign corporation. EuroSub is resident in
European Country B where its effective tax rate is 25%, and there is no
withholding tax on outbound payments. USCorp causes EuroSub to
create a wholly owned business organization in tax haven Country C
that has no income tax. This organization is treated as a disregarded
entity 02 under U.S. tax law but as a juridical entity under the tax laws of
both Country B and the tax haven Country C. EuroSub transfers
important foreign business intangibles to the tax haven entity, which
101. See genemily Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supm note 17 (explaining the creation
and effect of stateless income); Wells & Lowell, supra note 88 (same).
102. SeeTreas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(a), -3(a) (2006).
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licenses them to EuroSub in return for large royalty payments that are
the maximum allowable under transfer pricing law and that are
deductible as EuroSub business expenses under Country B law. The tax
haven entity also loans money to EuroSub in return for interest
payments that are the maximum allowable under transfer pricing law
and that are deductible by EuroSub under Country B law.
The arrangement in Example 4 does not create any Subpart F
income,' but the Country B deductions reduce EuroSub's foreign
taxes by effectively moving much of EuroSub's income from Country
B's tax base to the tax haven Country C." In theory, this reduction in
Country B tax liability will produce greater U.S. tax when dividends
ultimately flow from EuroSub to USCorp because there will be less
foreign tax to be credited against U.S. tax.' The U.S. foreign tax
credit, however, allegedly gives USCorp an incentive to avoid the
planning and transactional costs of this foreign tax minimization tactic
because dividends directly from EuroSub to USCorp will generate a
U.S. deemed-paid tax credit that will effectively eliminate the 25%
Country B tax on the shifted income without the tax haven
rigmarole."
Nevertheless, U.S. MNCs currently engage extensively in the tax
planning illustrated in Example 4 even though the U.S. foreign tax
credit should be incentivizing them to avoid it."' This may be due to
103. Subpart F income is defined in I.R.C. § 952 (2012). Generally speaking, U.S.
shareholders owning directly, indirectly, or constructively 10% or more of the voting stock of
a controlled foreign corporation are subject to current U.S. taxation on their shares of the
foreign corporation's Subpart F income. See id § 951. A foreign corporation is a controlled
foreign corporation if more than 50% of the voting power or value of its stock is owned by
such U.S. shareholders. See id. § 957(a). For a detailed discussion of these provisions, see 1
KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 5, ch. B3. In Example 4, the fact that the Country C
organization is a disregarded entity for U.S. tax purposes means that EuroSub's payments to it
are ignored and do not create income, including Subpart F income.
104. Another arrangement for shifting income from high-tax to low-tax foreign
countries is the "principal structure." For a description, see JOINT COMM., TAXATION OF
CROSS-BORDER INCOME, supm note 76, at 52.
105. See Mike Cooper, Gary Melcher & Clint Stretch, Suddenly SavingForeign Taxes
isAbusive? An Untenable lposa, 79 TAX NOTES 885, 888 (1998).
106. See I.R.C. §§ 902, 960. For a detailed discussion of these provisions, see 1
KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 5, ch. B4. Example 4 is a simplified version of the disregarded
entity strategy. For a description of the full measure of its complexity, see Kleinbard,
Stateless Income, supra note 17, at 706-13.
107. See Harry Grubert, Foreign Taxes and the Growing Share of US. Multinadonal
Company Income Abroad: Profits, Not Sales, Are Being Globalizeo 65 NAT'L TAX J. 247,
249, 251 (2012) (analysis of tax return data for 865 large U.S. multinational corporations
shows that their average foreign effective tax rate declined by 5 percentage points from 1996
to 2004 and that use of disregarded entities "seems to have accounted for 1 to 2 percentage
points of the 5.0 percentage point decline"); Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supm note 17, at
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the fact that the Country B tax would have to be paid currently,
whereas much of EuroSub's profits are likely to be invested
indefinitely offshore so that the benefit from credits for the 25%
Country B tax would be significantly deferred and thus potentially
diminished in value.o' Whatever the reason, the tax minimization
strategy shown in Example 4 is a major reducer of the foreign tax
liabilities of U.S. MNCs,'" and the alleged disincentive of the U.S.
foreign tax credit does not seem to do much to discourage the use of
the strategy.
Things would likely change if the United States were to adopt a
real worldwide, or full inclusion, system under which (1) deferral was
abolished; (2) the income of controlled foreign subsidiaries was
subject to a current U.S. tax with a credit for foreign taxes; and
(3) cross-crediting was severely limited. In this scenario, the tax
planning that creates zero-taxed foreign income in Example 4 would
seem to be truly pointless because the income would bear an
immediate, full U.S. tax even if it were permanently reinvested off
shore."o The manufacturing of stateless or homeless income
seemingly would end, and in the context of Example 4, the U.S. tax
"take" would surely be limited to the 10 percentage point excess of
the 35% U.S. tax over the U.S. credit for the 25% Country B tax.
Should USCorp's abandonment of the strategy to minimize
foreign taxes in Example 4 by moving income from high-tax Country
B to tax haven Country C be regarded as unfortunate so far as the
United States is concerned? We think not. At a time when the United
States is acting to protect its own tax base by seeking the assistance of
other countries and their resident financial institutions to gather
information regarding the foreign-source income of U.S. residents, it
would seem counterproductive to encourage U.S. residents to erode
737-50; see also CBO, OPTIONS FOR TAXING, supra note 7, at 14-17 (discussing profit shifting
techniques and their effects); IMF, supm note 3, at 17 (same).
108. See Sheppard, supra note 92 (reviewing a 2015 report by Moody's, Inc. showing
that cumulative foreign earnings reported as permanently invested offshore were $93 billion
for Microsoft, $70 billion for Apple, $47 billion for Google, and $74 billion for Pfizer).
Professor Shaviro observes that under the so-called new view of dividends, assuming
eventual repatriation and constant tax rates, deferral will not result in diminished present
value of foreign tax credits. Shaviro, supm note 33, at 83-85. He continues, however, to
point out that in practice these assumptions do not generally hold. Accordingly, deferral
introduces risk that foreign tax credits will not be fully utilized or otherwise not maintain
their full value. Id at 85-87.
109. See sources cited supo note 107.
110. SeeKEIGHTLEY & STuPAK, supmnote 28, at 15.
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the tax bases of those countries with the stateless/homeless income
strategy illustrated in Example 4.
At this point, it is worth noting that it is disingenuous to argue
that because the foreign tax credit allegedly makes U.S. residents
indifferent to maximizing U.S. residual tax by minimizing foreign
taxes, the U.S. foreign tax credit should be replaced with an
exemption or territorial system. An exemption system would totally
eliminate the U.S. residual tax on foreign-source active income.
Granted, U.S. residents would then be highly incentivized to minimize
foreign taxes but that is only because there would be no U.S. tax.
Thus, foreign tax minimization strategies would not have any positive
effect on U.S. revenue. Concerns about protecting the US. residual
tax on active income are irrelevant under a territorial system.
Finally, some commentators seem to treat foreign taxes paid by
US. residents as having a zero positive effect on US. welfare."' This
view is overstated and wrong. It is obviously in the U.S. national
interest to have a world of functioning nation states. Whether foreign
tax revenue goes to absorb refugees that otherwise would come to the
United States, shoulder a larger portion of NATO defense costs, or
avoid the clear and present danger to the United States of a failed state
and the resulting need for military intervention, tax revenues paid to a
foreign sovereign that is not an enemy of the United States have more
than zero marginal utility for the United States and its residents. It is
doubtful that U.S. interests are served by incentivizing US. MNCs to
employ tax minimization strategies, such as those in Example 4, that
impair the fiscal foundations and social contracts of those states."2
C Elective Benefits Under Foreign Income Tax Systems
With the Example 4 structure out of the way, the remaining
strategies for reduction of foreign taxes would seem to be internal to
foreign systems, such as taking advantage of provisions that allow
taxpayers to defer income, accelerate deductions, and qualify for tax
expenditures. The costs of securing these benefits are often not very
high. It is unlikely that the U.S. foreign tax credit would cause U.S.
taxpayers to forgo such benefits in favor of claiming larger U.S.
111. See sources cited supm note 33.
112. See genemlly OECD, Action Plan, supm note 82, at 8 (detailing the harmful
effects that flow from US. MNCs minimizing their tax burdens); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARv. L. REV
1573 (2000) (same).
30 [Vol. 91:1
2016] TWO CHEERS FOR THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT 31
foreign tax credits that are potentially subject to disputes with the IRS
on various grounds."'
D Chooshng Between Foreign Counties
However, there is one other point to consider regarding the
interaction of the U.S. foreign tax credit and the income taxes
imposed by other countries. It is illustrated by Example 5.
Example 5: USCorp, a Delaware corporation, bears a U.S. effective tax
rate of 35%. It has exhausted U.S. investment opportunities that
produce competitive returns and is considering expanding by building a
new factory in either Country D or Country E. Both factories will
require a $10 million investment, but the Country D factory would
yield an annual 20% before-tax return ($2,000,000) while the Country
E factory's annual before-tax return would be only 15% ($1,500,000).
However, the Country D effective tax rate would be 30% while the
Country E effective tax rate would be zero because Country E would
grant a tax holiday for the expected life of the new factory.
On these facts, the Country D factory is the economically
superior investment by 5 percentage points ($500,000). When foreign
taxes are taken into account ($600,000 in Country D and zero in
Country E), however, the Country D after-foreign-tax return drops to
14% ($1,400,000), while the Country E after-foreign-tax return equals
the 15% ($1,500,000) before-tax return. Without U.S. income tax,
USCorp would build the new factory in Country E, which would be
bad for the world economy because it would lose 5 percentage points
of economic value creation. Nevertheless, as the argument goes, this
would be good for the United States because an American corporation
would be earning a 15%, instead of 14%, after-foreign-tax return on a
$10 million investment.114
Things change if we assume a U.S. tax system with a foreign tax
credit and no deferral. In that case, there would be a 5% U.S. residual
tax ($100,000) on the Country D return (reducing it to 13% or
$1,300,000) and a 35% U.S. residual tax on the Country E return
(dropping it to 9.75% or $975,000), and USCorp would go with the
Country D factory. Purely in terms of results after foreign taxes but
before U.S. taxes, this would result in a $100,000 economic loss
($1,500,000-$1,400,000) to USCorp and to U.S. national well-being.
113. See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2 (2006) (detailing requirements that must be met in
order for a foreign tax to qualify as a creditable income tax).
114. SeeViard, supm note 33, at 560-6 1.
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On the other hand, if the United States employed a territorial
system, there would be no U.S. residual tax, the relevant after-foreign-
tax returns would remain at 15% for the Country E factory and 14%
for the Country D factory, and USCorp would locate the factory in
Country E.
Alan D. Viard of the American Enterprise Institute has argued
that the appropriate analysis should focus on after-foreign-tax
results.'" Under that approach, Viard asserts that locating the factory
in Country E is the better result from a U.S. perspective because it
results in USCorp, "our" national champion, enhancing our national
well-being by earning a greater after-foreign-tax return than
otherwise."'
Although this conclusion is rigorously reasoned, it overlooks the
revenue effect. Under a worldwide system without deferral and cross-
crediting, USCorp will choose the investment in Country D that will
yield a 5% residual tax for the United States. In contrast, if the United
States adopts a territorial system to induce USCorp to make the
Country E investment, the U.S. residual tax will be zero.
This conclusion is also questionable from an additional
perspective. On the facts of Example 5, the 35% U.S. residual tax is
the factor that tips USCorp away from Country E's 15% after-foreign-
tax return. Thus, the national champion argument calls for absolving
USCorp from the residual tax that the United States is entitled to
impose under customary international law. As we have explained in
earlier work, this argument amounts to a plea for an inefficient tax
subsidy, analogous to the inefficiency of an export subsidy. Such
subsidies are inefficient, even if other countries grant them to their
national champions."'
But if such tax subsidies were granted to USCorp and all other
U.S. MNCs that find themselves in situations similar to Example 5,
would the economic benefit to those MNCs create sufficient spill-
over benefits to the U.S. economy to make the subsidies worthwhile?
The recent evidence suggests that the answer is no.
As we have explained in prior work, because of deferral and
cross-crediting, U.S. MINCs already largely escape U.S. residual tax
on their foreign-source income and thereby receive a de facto
115. Seeid
116. Seeid.
117. See David Brumbaugh, Export Tax Subsidies, i THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
TAxAHON & TAx POLICY 130, 132 (Joseph J. Cordes, Robert D. Ebel & Jane G. Gravelle eds.,
2d ed. 2005); McDaniel, supm note 55, at 1624-25.
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subsidy."' But the result has not been a cornucopia of new U.S.
jobs."' More narrowly, in 2004 Congress enacted a provision that
waived most of the U.S. residual tax on foreign income repatriated
within a limited time window in 2004 and 2005.120 D
congressional development of this legislation, advocates argued that it
would result in large amounts of previously untaxed earnings being
brought home to U.S. MNCs that would use the funds for domestic
business expansions and that such expansions would, in turn, create
domestic jobs. 2' Economic studies have, however, uniformly found
that the foreign income repatriated under this provision was
principally used to finance dividends, stock redemptions, and
corporate acquisitions, all of which primarily benefit upper-income
taxpayers.'22 The predicted explosion of domestic jobs from corporate
expansion did not occur.'23 This evidence combines to cast
118. See Fleming & Peroni, Reivigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis, supra note 58,
at 528-61.
119. The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has stated:
There is no definitive conclusion about the effect of outbound investment on U.S.
employment. [A survey of the empirical literature] concludes, "[T]he evidence
suggests that the effect of overseas production on the home-country labor market
involves the composition of a firm's home employment rather than the total
amount. That change in composition is mainly a shift toward more managerial and
technical employment...."
JolNT Comm., ALTERNATIVE POLIcIEs, supm note 21, at 20 (quoting Robert E. Lipsey,
Outward Direct Investment and the US. Economy 38 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 4691, 1994)) (internal quote immaterially modified in ALTERNATIVE
POLICIES); see Grubert, supm note 107, at 278 ("The positive effects implied by the 'low tax
burdens on foreign income are good for domestic investment' argument and the negative
effects implied by the 'export of jobs' argument seem to cancel."); see also Martin A.
Sullivan, US Multinationals Cut US Jobs While ExpandingAbroad 128 TAx NOTEs 1102,
1102 (2010) (stating that low job growth in the United States is correlated to the rise in U.S.
MNCs' robust overseas hiring practices); Scott Thurm, US. Fims Add Jobs, But Mostly
Overseas, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2012, at Bl (same); Sudeep Reddy, Domestic-Based
Multinationals Hing Overseas, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:08 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001
424127887324763404578430960988848252(same).
120. See JOINT Comm., IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL TAx REFORM, supm note 9, at 26-
27.
121. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Eviscerating the US. Foreign Tax
Credit Lihitations and Cutting the Repatriation Tax- Whath ETIRepeal Got to Do With It.8
35 TAXNFEs INT'L 1081, 1099-1100 (2004).
122. See Justin Bryan, Individual Income Tax Returns, 2011, in IRS STATISTICS OF
INcoME BULLETIN 23 (Fall 2013) (showing dividend income, and therefore stock ownership,
concentrated among high-income individuals); Roy Clemons & Michael R. Kinney, An
Analysis of the Tax Holiday for Repatriation Under the Jobs Ac4 120 TAx NorEs 759 (2008)
(discussing that repatriated funds were used principally for stock repurchases).
123. See Martin A. Sullivan, Repatriation Holiday Would Destroy Ameican Jobs, 129
TAXNaFES 759 (2010).
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considerable doubt on the proposition that relieving U.S. MNCs from
U.S. residual tax will produce sufficient domestic economic benefits
to justify the tax subsidy.'24 Moreover, using a tax subsidy in Example
5 to cause USCorp to locate the factory in Country E is an
intervention deliberately crafted to cause USCorp to choose the
economically inferior investment. Paying U.S. corporations to switch
from superior to inferior options is facially wasteful and ought not to
be done without strong empirical support of substantial benefits to the
U.S. economy that has not been produced.
E Replacing the Foreign Tax Credit with a Combination ofa
Deduction and a Preferential Tax Rate: A Response to Professor
Shaviro
In our judgment, the preceding discussion in this Part IV has
shown that the alleged negative impact of the U.S. foreign tax credit
on decisions by U.S. residents to engage in foreign tax credit
minimization strategies is not a significant issue. To the extent it is a
bona fide concern, Professor Daniel Shaviro has proposed responding
by replacing the U.S. foreign tax credit with a deduction for foreign
taxes and pairing this deduction with a U.S. tax rate on foreign income
that is reduced to a level just low enough to mitigate the double
taxation that would otherwise result.'25 His idea has undergone
progressive development.1 2 6 In its most recent iteration, Professor
Shaviro proposes (1) replacement of the foreign tax credit with a
foreign tax deduction, (2) a low U.S. tax rate on a taxpayer's entire
foreign-source income if that income bears a sufficient overall foreign
tax rate, (3) a more substantial, but less than normal, U.S. tax on a
taxpayer's entire foreign-source income if that entire income bears no
foreign tax, and (4) a sliding scale of U.S. rates for total foreign
income that falls between (2) and (3).127
Professor Shaviro has explained that the top, bottom, and interim
U.S. tax rates in his proposal would be set to yield the same after-U.S.-
tax return that the taxpayer would enjoy on worldwide foreign-source
income if the United States continued to use the foreign tax credit.
He and a coauthor have provided the following formula for
124. See supm notes 119, 122, 123, and accompanying text.
125. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Retinlong Foreign Tax Credibblity, 63 NAT'L TAX J.
709, 717 (2010).
126. See id; Kimberly Clausing & Daniel Shaviro, A Burden-Neutral ShiAt from
Foreign Tax Cred&tability to Deductibity? 64 TAx L. REv 431 (2011).
127. See SHAViRo, supm note 33, at 192.
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calculating the appropriate U.S. rates where tus represents the
taxpayer's normal U.S. rate and tfrepresents the taxpayer's overall
foreign tax rate:
Appropriate U.S. rate = (t - 128
(1 - tf)
The critical elements of the proposal cut in opposite directions.
Specifically, a foreign tax deduction, instead of a credit, gives relief
from foreign taxation only to the extent of the foreign tax liability
multiplied by the taxpayer's U.S. marginal tax rate. Thus, the
deduction creates a partial double tax barrier to international business
and investment.'29 But since it gives only partial relief from double
taxation, it loses less revenue than does a foreign tax credit or an
exemption system. On the other hand, a reduced rate of tax on
foreign-source income amounts to a partial exemption system'30 that
subsidizes U.S. residents who locate new business and investment
activities in low-tax countries rather than in the United States; this
creates a tax revenue loss when compared to a real worldwide
system."' Example 6 explores how the opposing effects of Professor
Shaviro's proposal would net out.
Example 6: Corporate tax reform has occurred and USCorp, a
Delaware corporation, bears a U.S. effective tax rate of 25%. Also, the
United States has replaced the foreign tax credit with a foreign tax
deduction coupled with reduced rates on foreign-source income that are
derived from Professor Shaviro's formula set forth above. USCorp is
contemplating the following foreign investments that require equal
amounts of capital:
ForeignIandia
Investment 1: $100 before-tax return if made in the United States and
$95 before-tax return if made in ForeignIandia
Investment 2: $95 before-tax return if made in the United States and
$100 before-tax return if made in Foreignlandia
128. SeeClausing & Shaviro, supra note 126, at 435-38.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 66-71.
130. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Designig a 21st Century Corporate Tax, supra note
88, at 708-09. To illustrate, if the regular U.S. tax rate is 25% but the United States imposes a
10% tax on foreign-source income, the effect is the same as exempting 60% of the taxpayer's
foreign-source income and taxing the remaining 40% at the regular 25% rate ([$0.60 x 0] +
[$0.40 x .25] = $1.00 x .10).
131. See sources cited supra note 28.
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Otherlandia
Investment 3: $100 before-tax return if made in the United States and
$95 before-tax return if made in Otherlandia.
Investment 4: $95 before-tax return if made in the United States and
$100 before-tax return if made in Otherlandia.
Assume that (1) Foreignlandia has no income tax, (2) US Corp's
effective tax rate in Otherlandia would be 20%, (3) USCorp's overall
foreign effective tax rate would be 10%, and (4) the U.S. rate imposed
on all of its foreign-source income under Professor Shaviro's proposal
would be 16.67%."' To simplify, also assume that the U.S. tax applies
on a current basis; that is, there is no deferral.
Because Foreignlandia imposes a zero tax, there will be no
foreign tax to be deducted in the Foreignilandia scenario. Instead the
critical factor with respect to Investments 1 and 2 will be the
difference between the assumed 25% U.S. tax on domestic-source
income and the 16.67% U.S. tax that would be levied on
Foreignlandia-source income under Professor Shaviro's proposal.
Table 1 shows the results under Professor Shaviro's proposed system.
Table 1
After-Tax After-Tax
Return in Return in
United States Foreignlandia
Investment 1 Before-
Tax Return $7
($100 U.S./$95 $75 $79.16134
Foreignlandia)
Investment 2 Before-
Tax Return $8
($95 U.S./$ 100 $71.25 $83.33"'
Foreignlandia)
In terms of worldwide economic welfare, USCorp should make
Investment 1 in the United States and Investment 2 in Foreignlandia
because those locations yield the higher before-tax returns ($100
each). From this standpoint, Professor Shaviro's proposal achieves the
132. (.25 - .10) - (1 - .10) = .1667, using the formula quoted in the text.
133. $100 x(1-.25)=$75.
134. $95 x (1 - .1667) = $79.16.
135. $95 x (1-.25)= $71.25.
136. $100 x (1 -. 1667)= $83.33.
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wrong result with respect to Investment 1 because the higher after-tax
return for the ForeignIandia location will cause Investment 1 to be
made there."' The U.S. before-tax return on Investment I would have
to exceed $105.55 to get the correct location result. 38
In comparison, a U.S. worldwide system with a foreign tax
credit, no deferral, and a 25% U.S. tax on both domestic and foreign
income would give Investment 1 after-tax returns of $75131 in the
United States and $71.25140 in Foreignlandia and would give
Investment 2 after-tax returns of $71.25141 in the United States and
$75142 in Foreignlandia. Thus, USCorp would locate both investments
correctly-Investment 1 in the United States and Investment 2 in
Foreignlandia. Professor Shaviro's proposal, however, induces
USCorp to put Investment 1 in ForeignIandia-the wrong place-
thereby causing the United States to substitute a 16.67% tax on $95
($15.84) for a 25% tax on $100 ($25). This $9.16 revenue loss is
effectively a subsidy to USCorp for choosing an inferior investment in
a foreign country. The wisdom of such a subsidy is elusive.143
Turning to Investment 2, a worldwide system with a 25% U.S.
tax rate, a foreign tax credit, and no deferral would cause the United
States to collect $25 of residual tax revenue from the ForeignIandia-
located investment'" (which bears zero ForeignIandia tax). In
contrast, there would be only $16.67 of residual tax1 45 in the
Investment 2 scenario under Professor Shaviro's proposal. This $8.33
revenue loss is effectively a subsidy to USCorp for making a
Foreignlandia investment that it would have made without
subsidization. This is so because even under Professor Shaviro's
approach, an $8.33 reduction in the Investment 2 after-tax return
137. Even those who take a pure national welfare view would regard a Foreignlandia-
based Investment 1 as being in the wrong location because it is not in the United States. See
JOINT COMM., INTACT OF INTERNATIONAL TAx REFORM, supm note 9, at 59-60; Viard, supm
note 33, at 560-62, 564. U.S. multinational corporations would, however, regard Investment 1
as being in the right place because the Foreignlandia location produces the greater after-tax
return.
138. $105.55 x (1- .25) = $79.16.
139. $100 x (1 -. 25) = $75.
140. $95 x (1 - .25) = $71.25.
141. $95 x (1-.25)= $71.25.
142. $100 x (1 -. 25) = $75.
143. In other work, we have explained why the competitiveness argument does not
support this subsidy. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Peispectives, supm note 26, at 1085-86.
144. $100x.25 =$25.
145. $100x .1667=$16.67.
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would leave Foreignlandia as the superior after-tax location.1' Thus,
the subsidy for Investment 2 makes no sense unless one accepts the
contention that it is necessary to make USCorp's Investment 2
competitive in the Foreignlandia market.
In earlier work, we have explained why the competitiveness
argument is unsound.'4 7 Here we add the observation that although
Professor Shaviro's proposal subsidizes USCorp's Investment 2 to the
extent of $8.33, it nevertheless imposes a $16.67 residual tax on that
investment. Because there is no foreign tax credit, this tax cannot be
reduced by cross-crediting. For anyone who has embraced the
competitiveness view, which we do not suggest includes Professor
Shaviro, this is an unacceptable result because it allegedly makes
USCorp's Investment 2 noncompetitive against equivalent
Foreignlandia investments made by multinational corporations that
are resident in territorial system countries and therefore pay no
residual tax on their Foreignlandia income.148 More broadly, because
Professor Shaviro's proposal applies a preferential, but positive, tax
rate to foreign-source income, the result is always a positive U.S.
residual tax. This is inconsistent with the zero U.S. residual tax
required by the standard iteration of the competitiveness argument.
Under that standard iteration, any positive U.S. residual tax is
anticompetitive."9 Interestingly, Professor Shaviro's proposal has its
greatest impact in the zero foreign tax situation because his formula
causes the U.S. residual tax rate to increase as the foreign tax rate
decreases. For true believers in the competitiveness argument, the
only attraction of Professor Shaviro's proposal is that a U.S. residual
146. $83.33 - $8.33 = $75, as compared with a $71.25 after-tax return in the United
States.
147. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Petspectives, supra note 26, at 1085-87; see also
KEIGHTLEY & STUPAK, sum note 28, at 16 (explaining that competitiveness is a flawed
criterion).
148. See NFTC 1, supra note 31, at 12; Kimberly A. Clausing, Beyond Tenitoial and
Worldwide Systems of Taxation, 15 J. INT'L FIN. & EcoN. 43, 50 (2015).
149. See NFTC 1, supa note 31, at 12. Some territorial systems, however, do not
allocate headquarters' expenses to foreign subsidiaries. Instead, they allow headquarters'
expenses that benefit foreign subsidiaries to be deducted against domestic income, while
imposing a small tax on dividends received from subsidiaries as a rough proxy for the
forgone allocation. In such a case, the small tax is effectively offset (perhaps even more than
offset) by the benefit of larger-than-appropriate deductions against taxable U.S.-source
income. See JoiNT CoMM., BACKGROUND AND ISsUES, supma note 8, at 23, 25; Rosanne
Altshuler, Stephen Shay & Eric Toder, Lessons the United States Can Learn fmm Other
Countries' Tenitonal Systems for Taxing Income of Multinational Corporations, TAx PoL'Y
CTR. 26 (Jan. 21, 2015), www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-
pdfs/2000077
-lessons-the-us-can-leam-from-other-countries.pdf
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tax at a reduced rate is better than a U.S. residual tax at the regular
rate.
The Otherlandia scenario in Example 6 introduces the
assumption of a 20% Otherlandia effective tax rate and continues to
assume a 25% U.S. rate on domestic income and a 16.67% U.S. rate
on foreign-source income. The results under Professor Shaviro's
proposed system are shown in Table 2.
Table 2
After-Tax After-Tax
Return in Return in
United Otherlandia
States
Investment 3 Before-Tax
Return $75150 $63.33"'
($100 U.S./$95 Otherlandia)
Investment 4 Before-Tax
Return $71.25152 $66.66"'
($95 U.S./$100 Otherlandia)
Here, Professor Shaviro's proposal gets the correct location for
Investment 3 but not Investment 4. Investment 3 should be made in
the United States, and Investment 4 should be made in Otherlandia
because those are the locations with the superior before-tax returns.
As Table 2 shows, however, both investments will be made in the
United States because that is where both yield higher after-tax returns.
With respect to locating Investment 4 in Otherlandia, Professor
Shaviro's substitution of a $20 U.S. foreign tax deduction (worth $20
x .1667 = $3.33) for a $20 U.S. foreign tax credit (worth $20) creates
a $16.67 tax "loss" for USCorp that outweighs the gains that it would
150. $100 x (1 -. 25) = $75.
151. $95 x .20 = $19 Foreigniandia tax.
$95 - $19 = $76 U.S. tax base.
$76 x. 1667 = $12.67 U.S. tax.
$95 - $19 - $12.67 = $63.33 after-tax return in Foreigniandia.
152. $95 x (1 -. 25) = $71.25.
153. $100 x .20 = $20 ForeignIandia tax.
$100 - $20 = $80 U.S. tax base.
$80 x .1667 = $13.34 U.S. tax.
$100 - $20 - $13.34 = $66.66 after-tax return in ForeignIandia.
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have from the greater before-tax return in Otherlandia and the below
normal U.S. tax on Otherlandia-source income."
Some might argue that there is nothing wrong with USCorp
choosing a U.S. location for Investment 4 because having Investment
4 on U.S. soil instead of in Otherlandia makes the United States better
off although the Otherlandia investment is economically superior. Is
the United States advantaged by having USCorp own an inferior
investment in the United States instead of a superior investment in
Otherlandia? That is ultimately an empirical question which, to our
best knowledge, has not generated a definitive empirical answer.
Economic orthodoxy, however, holds that the U.S. taxing scheme that
causes USCorp to forgo the Otherlandia location for Investment 4 is
an inefficient allocation of resources and that it therefore is in the best
interest of the United States to adopt rules that do not interfere with
USCorp placing Investment 4 in Otherlandia." Professor Shaviro's
proposal would frustrate that outcome.
Of course, USCorp's decision to make Investment 4 in the
United States saved the Treasury from losing the difference between a
25% tax on $95 and a 16.67% tax on $100 minus the 20%
Otherlandia tax thereon.' This is an ambiguous fact though because
the 16.67% tax represents a congressional policy decision to suffer
any revenue loss that results from a below normal tax on foreign-
source income.
The locational problems illustrated in Tables 1 and 2 arise
because Professor Shaviro's formula produces a U.S. rate for foreign-
source income that is based on the individual taxpayer's average
effective rate on foreign-source income. As Tables 1 and 2 show, this
approach produces imperfect results when the taxpayer earns, or has
the opportunity to earn, foreign income in countries with rates that are
significantly highei or lower than the taxpayer's average foreign
effective tax rate. These problems would disappear if Professor
Shaviro's system were applied on a country-by-country basis.' But
154. The before-tax return advantage of the Otherlandia location is $100 - $95 = $5.
After Otherlandia and U.S. tax, this is worth $3.33. The advantage from the below normal
U.S. tax on the Otherlandia investment is ($80 x .25) - ($80 x .1667) = $6.66. The sum of
these advantages is $3.33 + $6.66 = $9.99. The $16.67 tax loss referred to in the text exceeds
these advantages by $6.68 ($16.67 - $9.99). If this $6.68 of excess loss had not been suffered,
the after-tax return on Investment 4 in Otherlandia would have been $66.66 + $6.68 = $73.34,
and Investment 4 would have been made in Otherlandia.
155. See sources cited supra note 65.
156. (.25 x $95)-.1667[$100-($100x .20)]=$10.41.
157. See Clausing & Shaviro, supra note 126, at 435-37.
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he has concluded that doing so would be impractical.' Consequently,
we are left with the results of Tables 1 and 2.
Generally speaking, Tables 1 and 2 show that Professor Shaviro's
proposal is problematic in that it produces locational errors and
dubious subsidies. Moreover, the problem that it seeks to solve-U.S.
taxpayer indifference to minimizing foreign taxes in a foreign tax
credit system-seems to be small.'" In addition, the proposal's rate
distinction between foreign-source income and U.S.-source income
would require prophylactic rules to deal with the responsive income-
shifting strategies that inevitably would be employed by taxpayers,
and the proposal would place considerable pressure on the source and
transfer pricing rules. Thus, Professor Shaviro's proposal would not
be simple in practice. We are not persuaded that it is a superior
alternative to a regime that employs a foreign tax credit without
significant cross-crediting and that taxes foreign-source income at
normal rates and without deferral.
If, however, the choice were limited to either Professor Shaviro's
proposal or a territorial system, we would prefer Professor Shaviro's
approach. In part, this is because the residual U.S. tax that it imposes
makes it less costly to the fisc than a territorial system that, by
definition, imposes no residual tax on foreign-source active income.
More importantly, this absence of a residual tax in a territorial system
increases the danger that U.S. residents will prefer investments in low-
tax foreign countries even when they have a lower pretax rate of
return than investments in the United States."* On the other hand, if a
real worldwide system (having a limited foreign tax credit, no
deferral, and no significant cross-crediting) is included in the menu of
choices, it is clearly our preferred option.
V. THE FOREIGN TAx CREDIT AS ALLOCATOR OF THE
INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAX BASE: COMMENTS ON
INTERNATION EQUITY
A. Tenitotial Compared with Worldwide
Some of the literature regarding allocation of the international
income tax base assumes that the world's leading nations have
surrendered (or should surrender) the right to tax their residents'
worldwide business incomes so that only source taxation of business
158. Seeidat437.
159. See supm text accompanying notes 106-112.
160. See sources cited supm note 28.
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income is relevant."' Thus, this viewpoint posits that the world
consists (or should consist) of countries that apply only source
taxation to business income. From that standpoint, the process of
allocating the international tax base is limited to requiring that each
country identify the business income that is sufficiently connected
with its territory to warrant application of its source tax regime. The
principal alternatives for carrying out this source tax allocation
exercise are an explicit territorial system that employs transfer pricing
and source rules,'62 a global formulary apportionment system,'63 and
various formulary hybrids.'"
In prior work, we have explained why taxation of residents on
their worldwide incomes, as is permitted by customary international
law,6 5 should be practiced by the world's nations for reasons of
fairness and efficiency" We therefore do not subscribe to a vision of
the world that consists entirely of source country taxation. The United
161. See, e g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael C. Durst,
Aflocatmg Busmess Profits for Tax Purposes A Proposal To Adopt a Formulary Profit Split
9 FLA. TAx REv. 497 (2009); Adam H. Rosenzweig, Defming a Countrys "Fair Share" of
Taxes, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 373 (2015); Sol Picciotto, Towards Unitary Taxation of
Tansnational Corporations, TAx JUST. NETWORK (2012), www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/
Towards Unitary Taxation 1-1 .pdf
162. See BRIAN I ARNOLD & MICHAEL J. MCINTYRE, INTERNATIONAL TAx PRIMER 35(2d ed. 2002); JoNr COMM., BACKGROUND AND ISSUES, supra note 8, at 11; PREsIDENT'S
ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. Tax REFORM, supra note 22, at 134.
163. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, FormulayApportionment, supra note 7, at 32-47.
We use the term "global formulary apportionment" to refer to the process of
formulaically allocating a multinational corporate group's entire worldwide consolidated
income among the source tax regimes of the countries in which it has activities instead of
using source rules and transfer pricing principles to make the allocation. See id In contrast,
a formulary approach is sometimes used for the limited purpose of allocating only discrete
types of income, such as intangibles income, within a worldwide system. Seeid at 53-56.
In theory, global formulary apportionment could be used to distinguish foreign-source
and domestic-source income (or discrete types of such income) for purposes of applying the
U.S. foreign tax credit limitation. Global formulary apportionment supporters do not seem to
have advocated this approach, however. Seeid at 56; Peroni, supra note 57, at 1002-03 n.78.
164. See generally SIAvIRO, supra note 33, at 190 (proposing that foreign-source
income be taxed but at a rate substantially below the generally applicable rate); Elizabeth
Chorvat, Forcmg Multnationals To Play Fair Proposals for a Rigorous Transfer Prcing
Theory, 54 ALA. L. REV 1251 (2003) (proposing a formulary apportionment international tax
regime based on location of assets and imputed returns); Rosenzweig, supra note 161(proposing a formulary apportionment international tax regime based on "amenities" and
returns to public goods).
165. See sources cited supra note 2.
166. See generallyFleming, Peroni & Shay, Perspectives, supra note 26 (arguing that a
worldwide tax system is superior to a hybrid tax system in avoiding distortion, inefficiencies,
and unfairness).
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States should continue to employ and enhance its worldwide taxation
regime. 67
From the standpoint of worldwide taxation, allocating the
international income tax base is not limited to calculating the
respective source taxation bases of the world's nations. It also
involves allocating the base between residence countries and source
countries. This, in turn, requires the identification of relevant
allocation principles.
B. Searchng forAllocation Prmciples
Certain familiar principles serve as fairness norms for allocating
the tax burden among both a country's residents and the nonresidents
who earn income within its borders. These principles include ability-
to-pay,' horizontal equity,'" vertical equity,7 o and benefits received."'
Although the guidance these norms provide is not scientifically
precise, they at least furnish a framework for debating the ethical
component of domestic tax policy.' 72 Regrettably, these principles say
nothing useful about how rights to tax international income should be
allocated among residence countries and source countries.73
In the absence of clear normative guidance, 74 we must default to
the empirical fact that source countries are effectively positioned to
tax income earned on their soil before residence country tax systems
167. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Formulary Apportionmen4 supm note 7, at 18-19
(describing a robust, or "real," worldwide taxation regime).
168. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness in International Taxation, supm note 2, at
306-14.
169. See DODGE, FLEMING & PERONI, supra note 66, at 72.
170. Seeid.at73.
171. Seeid.at74-75.
172. See generally Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness in International Taxation, supra
note 2 (discussing how equity is analyzed, and often not analyzed, in relation to international
tax policy).
173. See Corwin, supra note 1, at 136; Mindy Herzfeld, Tax Planning and Faurness in
International Tax, 79 TAX NOTES INT'L 103, 104-05 (2015); Schon, supr note 1, at 72-78; see
also Benshalom, supra note 1, at 72-73 (noting that there is little philosophical literature
discussing internation equity in comparison to the literature discussing domestic
redistribution); Li, supra note 1, at 119 (discussing the difference between equity among
individual taxpayers and equitable allocation of the tax base between nations).
174. Advocates for the interests of poor countries have argued that wealthy countries
should aid poor countries, including possibly providing assistance through tax measures. We
agree. See Benshalom, supra note 1, at 67-8 1; Li, supra note 1, at 121, 124. However, those
arguments have not yet created a recognized basis for asserting that poor countries have a
normative right to some defined portion of the global tax revenues. See Christians, supra
note 1, at 151; Ring, supra note 2, at 180-83, 225.
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can impose tax.' Given this reality, it is not surprising that
international law allows source countries the primary taxing right with
respect to international income and that residence countries are
limited to imposing a tax that is reduced to accommodate the prior
source tax.' As previously discussed, this accommodation is
achieved either (1) by the residence country granting a foreign tax
credit for the source country tax and collecting a residual tax to the
extent that residence tax exceeds the source tax'" or (2) by the
residence country adopting a territorial system under which it
effectively waives its right to collect a residual tax on active income.17 8
Not only do these two approaches mitigate international double
taxation, they also have "worked" for decades to allocate the
international income tax base among the nations of the world. To be
specific, the foreign tax credit approach recognizes the superior taxing
right of source countries but only to the extent that a source tax is
actually imposed. If the source country fails to tax up to the level of
the residence country so that the residence tax exceeds the source tax,
the foreign tax credit approach allows the residence country to capture
the excess with a residual tax.' Thus, the foreign tax credit
effectively takes a "use it or lose it" approach to accommodating the
source country's superior taxing right. In contrast, the territorial
approach cedes taxing jurisdiction over active income to the source
country regardless of the extent to which the source country actually
uses its taxing power to raise revenue.'
175. As noted by Brian Arnold:
Whatever the theoretical justification for source-country taxation of business
profits, in my opinion source countries will tax any business profits of non-
residents that they can tax effectively unless there is some good reason not to do so.
The critical issue, therefore, is the practical enforcement of source-country
taxation, not the theoretical justification for such tax.
Brian J. Arnold, Threshold Requirements for Taxing Bushiess Profits Under Tax Treades, in
THE TAXATION OF BusINEss PRoFYTs UNDER TAX TREATIES 55, 104 (Brian J. Arnold, Jacques
Sasseville & Eric M. Zolt eds., 2003); see also Ault & Bradford, supm note 30, at 32
("[F]orce majeure has been as important as any ethical conception of sovereignty in
producing a general acceptance of the priority of the 'source' jurisdiction to tax particular
transactions.").
176. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 413 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1986); OECD, Model Tax Convendon supm note 6;
U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Aff., supra note 6; Brauner, supra note 6. Tax treaties, however,
commonly reduce source taxes, thereby increasing the opportunities for residence countries to
collect residual tax.
177. See sources cited supra note 10.
178. See sources cited supra note 7.
179. See sources cited supm note 11.
180. SeeLi, supra note 1, at 127.
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Granted, this system means that residence taxation is at the
"mercy" of source taxation. However, as explained in Parts E1 and lY
there are realistic constraints on source taxation that leave room for
residence countries to collect a residual tax.
The tax base allocation regime that results from worldwide
taxation and the foreign tax credit effectively eliminates international
double taxation while upholding the principle of ability-to-pay and
avoiding bias in favor of foreign investment. In contrast, territoriality
encourages foreign countries to use low taxes to lure investment away
from residence countries. This encouragement has particularly
negative effects on low-income countries that are subjected to fierce
competition for foreign investment and the important revenue it
generates. By effectively imposing a "use it or lose it" rule on source
countries, the foreign tax credit allows residence countries to defend
themselves against this tax competition while also fully
accommodating the normatively superior taxing rights of source
countries. Indeed, there is no norm that requires residence countries
to restrict their worldwide taxation rights in order to facilitate a source
country's decision not to impose source tax."' The foreign tax credit
regime rejects such a restriction. In contrast, the territorial approach
grants source countries a nontaxation right that produces the revenue
loss and distortion consequences previously discussed in this
Article.'82
C The Pight ofDevelopmg Countries
The flip side of the "use it or lose it" rule is that because the
residence country's residual tax captures the excess of the residence
tax over a low source country tax, a real worldwide system with a
foreign tax credit deprives developing countries of the ability to
achieve growth by using low taxes to lure investment away from
developed countries that employ the foreign tax credit approach to
international taxation.183 Professor Alexander Rust has refined this
181. See Benshalom, supm note 1, at 77-78 (lamenting the absence of such a norm);
see also Christians, supm note 1, at 151 ("We may not yet (or ever) be in a position to discuss
whether countries have a duty to redistribute income or otherwise seek global distributive
justice through globally-oriented tax policy choices."); Sch6n, supra note 1, at 91 ("[T]ax
jurisdiction is by no means restricted to income 'generated' in the territory of the taxing
entity; worldwide taxation is customarily accepted under international law.").
182. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
183. See Benshalom, supm note 1, at 77; Elkins, supm note 50, at 927; Charles I.
Kingson, The Coherence ofInternadonal Taxadon, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1151, 1159-60 (1981);
Li, supm note 1, at 128. This tax competition has been disfavored in recent years as
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observation by pointing out (1) that because of developing countries'
deficits in economic inputs, investments in those countries will
usually have lower pretax returns than competing investments in
wealthy countries, (2) that worldwide taxation with a limited foreign
tax credit and a cross-crediting barrier (i.e., real worldwide taxation)
will inevitably cause those lower pretax returns to morph into lower
after-tax returns,'84 and (3) that poor countries, therefore, will be
permanently disadvantaged in competing for international investment
capital unless they are given relief from the consequences of real
worldwide taxation.' Nevertheless, this argument is clearly a plea for
economic aid in the form of nonresistance to the impact of low source
taxes on the tax bases of residence countries.'
We agree with the proposition that comparatively wealthy
countries like the United States should assist developing countries out
of both a duty to do so and a proper understanding of U.S. self-
interest.'"' Recognizing a duty to assist is not, however, the same as
agreeing that developing countries have the right to define the type,
amount, and terms of the assistance. Thus, with respect to the present
discussion, no normative principle requires the United States to
passively accept appropriation of its tax base by low-tax developing
countries without inquiry into whether those countries are hostile or
friendly to the United States, oppressive or committed to the rule of
law, democratically governed or ruled by kleptocrats,' and a host of
inhibiting the revenue mobilization required to fund critical public goods that are the
foundation for successful foreign direct investment and are essential to achieve development
goals. See, e.g., OECD, Action Plan, supm note 82, at 10, 13-19; SLEMROD & GLLITZER,
supmanote 25, at 180-81; Joel Slemrod & John D. Wilson, Tax Competition withPaasitic Tax
Havens, 93 J. PuB. EcoN. 1261 (2009). For a contrary view, see Elkins, supra note 50
(defending tax competition on worldwide efficiency and welfare grounds).
184. This is the case because a real worldwide system's currently imposed residual tax
causes investments that have a comparatively higher before-tax rate of return to also have a
comparatively higher after-tax rate of return. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Perspectives,
supm note 26, at 1084-85.
185. Professor Rust explained this argument to one of us at a workshop conducted in
the Doctor of International Business Taxation Program at the Vienna University of
Economics and Business in October 2015. We thank him for his assistance.
186. See Li, supra note 1, at 129 (characterizing development assistance through tax
sparing as "a cross-border tax subsidy").
187. See supm text accompanying notes 110-112.
188. See Corrption Perceptons Index 2014, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, www.transparency.
org/cpi2014 (last visited Sept. 4, 2016) (showing that the world's developing countries are,
with exceptions, plagued by corruption); see also Michael Littlewood, Tax Competition:
Harmfulto Whom., 26 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 411, 441 (2004) ("[I]t seems difficult to categorize
the withholding of aid as a violation of sovereignty.").
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other similar considerations.'" A real worldwide system.coupled with
negotiated, carefully tailored tax sparing" and direct monetary
189. See Anthony C. Infanti, Internation Equity and Human Development in TAX,
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 209, 238 (Yariv Brauner & Miranda Stewart eds., 2013) ("A more
robust notion of internation equity that aims at advancing human development could be used
to sort out 'worthy' from 'unworthy' recipients of development assistance. Those with a
record of promoting advances in human development ... could easily be targeted for greater
aid than those without such a record."). But see Luis Eduardo Schoueri, Tax Sparing: A
Reconsideration ofthe Reconsideration, in TAX, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, supra, at 106, 120-
23 (apparently arguing that residence countries should not have this level of discretion when
the issue is whether residence countries should use tax sparing credits to accommodate tax
incentives granted by developing countries).
190. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness i International Taxation supra note 2, at
344-49; Li, supra note 1, at 128-29. Tax sparing usually means that the residence country
allows a foreign tax credit not only for income taxes actually paid by a resident to a
developing country but also for income taxes that would have been paid if the developing
country had not applied a temporarily reduced tax to the resident as an inducement for the
resident to locate business or investment activity in the developing country. See GUSTAFSON,
PERONI & PUGH, supra note 3, at 404. In principle, however, tax sparing could be applied to
the permanent difference between the low income tax rate in a developing country and the
higher rate in the residence country.
The OECD has issued a report on tax sparing, which seeks to develop among the OECD
countries "a more coherent position towards the granting [and design] of tax sparing
[provisions]." ORG. FOR EcoN. CO-OPERATION & DEv, TAx SPARING: A RECONSIDERATION 3
(1998). "[T]his report does not suggest that OECD and other countries which have
traditionally granted tax sparing should necessarily cease to do so." Id. at 42. However, the
OECD report did identify "a number of concerns that put into question the usefulness of the
granting of tax sparing relief," including (1) the vulnerability of tax sparing to taxpayer abuse;
(2) the effectiveness of tax sparing as a method for providing foreign aid and promoting
economic development; and (3) "general concerns with the way in which tax sparing may
encourage countries to use tax incentives." Id. at 41. But see Schoueri, supra note 189
(criticizing the OECD report).
In this Article, we do not take sides in the debate over whether it is prudent for
developing countries to attempt to attract foreign capital with tax incentives. In addition, we
note that it is difficult for the United States to use bilaterally negotiated tax sparing credits.
This difficulty arises because of most favored nation commitments to extend those credits to
several other countries in addition to a treaty partner who obtained the credits through
bilateral negotiations. See, e.g., Protocol to the Convention Between the Government of the
Republic of Kazakhstan and the Government of the United States of America for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income and Capital, para. 8.d (Oct. 24, 1993). Our point is that if the United States
determines that a particular developing country's income tax incentive should be
accommodated, then carefully designed tax sparing is the preferable approach in comparison
to adoption of a generally applicable territorial system.
Regarding the need to carefully tailor tax sparing treaty provisions to avoid untoward
results and how to do so, see Kim Brooks, Tax Sparing: A Needed Incentive for Foreign
Investment i Low-Income Countries or an Unnecessary Revenue Sacnfice?, 34 QUEEN'S
L.J. 505 (2009). For a sampling of the other commentary on tax sparing, see TIMo
VIHERKENTTA, TAX INCENTIVES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIEs AND INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
(1991); Mary Bennett, Reflections on Current US. Policy for Developig Country Tax
Treaties, 2 TAX NOTES INT'L 698 (1990); B. Anthony Billings & Gary A. McGill, Tax Sparing
on US. Multinationals, 48 TAX NOrrEs 615 (1990); Kingson, supra note 183, at 1262-72;
Richard D. Kuhn, United States Tax Policy wth Respect to Less Developed Countries, 32
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transfers allows for these distinctions to be made without the
untoward effects of a territorial system. In contrast, a generally
applicable territorial system is a blunt instrument that permits all low-
tax countries to enjoy the full advantages of their low rates without
any of the preceding distinctions being made among those countries,
including distinctions between relatively poor countries
(Mozambique, to give one example) and relatively wealthy countries
that have chosen low tax rates as a competitive measure (e.g., Ireland).
Some commentators have objected that negotiated tax sparing
and direct monetary transfers treat assistance to developing countries
as demeaning charity rather than as an entitlement.' This seems
inevitable and unremarkable. The sovereign right'92 of a wealthy
country to decide how its not unlimited tax base will be used and to
make the kinds of distinctions between developing countries that were
suggested above means that discretion resides unavoidably in the
hands of wealthy countries. The relevant analogy is to the field of
charitable donations where donees are spread across a spectrum in
terms of their integrity and effectiveness. Consequently, donors are
encouraged to investigate these and other characteristics of their
potential donees and means are made freely available for them to do
so.'" Elected officials should do no less in their roles as stewards of
their respective countries' tax bases.
The argument that wealthy countries that employ worldwide
taxation with a foreign tax credit must modify their systems to
accommodate the low rates of low-tax countries is effectively an
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 261 (1963); Jeffrey Owens & Torsten Fensby, Is There a Need To
Reevaluate Tax Sparing., 16 TAx NoTEs INT'L 1447 (1998); Richard C. Pugh, The Deferral
Pnnciple and US. Investment m Developing Countries, in UNITED STATES TAXATION AND
DEVELOPING CouNTRIES 267, 270-71 (Robert Hellawell ed., 1980); Schoueri, supm note 189;
Damian Laurey, Note, Reexamning US. Tax Sparing Policy with Developing Countries: The
Merits ofFaing m Line with International Nonns, 20 VA. TAx REV. 467 (2000).
191. SeeBenshalom, supra note 1, at 77-78.
192. The concept of sovereignty continues to be a norm that legitimates the exercise of
both residence taxation and source taxation. See id at 73-75; Christians, supla note 1, at 99,
110-11; Ring, supra note 2, at 183; see also Itai Grinberg & Joost Pauwelyn, The Emergence
of a New International Tax Regime: The OECD Package on Base Erosion and Profit
Shil7ng (BEPS), AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. (Oct. 28, 2015), https://www.asil.org/insights/
volume/1 9/issue/24/emergence-new-international-tax-regime-oecd's-package-base-erosion-
and ("Tax policy is ... perceived as one of the last bastions of Westphalian sovereignty.").
Stated differently, in the world of international taxation, sovereignty is a two-way street; in the
context of assistance from developed countries to developing countries, this means that both
the country that seeks assistance and the country that provides assistance have legitimate
claims of sovereignty.
193. See CHARITY NAVIGATOR, www.charitynavigator.org (last visited Sept. 4, 2016);
CHARITY WATCH, www.charitywatch.org (last visited Sept. 4, 2016).
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argument that the wealthy countries have two mandatory normative
options: (1) give a credit for the full amount of income taxes that
would have been imposed by low-tax countries if they had not used
low rates to attract foreign investment (limited, however, to the tax
ordinarily imposed on domestic income by the credit-granting
country) or (2) give a credit limited to taxes actually imposed by low-
tax countries but make cash transfers to the low-tax countries that
equal the taxes not imposed. In a world in which all countries enjoy
sovereignty with respect to their expenditures, option (2) is not
sustainable as a mandatory norm. Because the former is the
equivalent of the latter, it is likewise unsustainable.
Someday, a world norm may arise that gives poorer countries an
entitlement to a portion of the wealthy countries' tax bases. But in the
present world of Westphalian tax sovereignty," rich countries are
allowed to unilaterally decide what to do with their tax bases so long
as they comply with the normative requirement of recognizing the
primacy of source taxes that are actually inposed'" The foreign tax
credit with negotiated tax sparing and/or foreign aid transfers is
consistent with this present world.
In summary, traditional fairness norms do not provide useful
guidance on how to allocate the international income tax base among
countries. However, the systems of territoriality and worldwide
taxation with a limited foreign tax credit provide base allocation
schemes that have been long recognized as legitimate under
international law. When comparing these two approaches, bona fide
concerns over avoiding locational distortions and defending the
residual tax base that is normatively assigned to residence countries
indicate that the allocation produced by the foreign tax credit
approach is superior to the allocation that results from any form of
territoriality.
VI. A PRINCIPLED, NONMANIPULABLE DEFINITION OF RESIDENCE
Is ESSENTIAL
Although the limited foreign tax credit that we have defended in
this Article is an important element of a well-designed territorial
system, our primary interest in the foreign tax credit arises from the
fact that it is absolutely critical to the structure of the real worldwide
194. See supm note 192.
195. See supm note 179.
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approach that we have consistently advocated in earlier work."'
However, a real worldwide income tax system with a limited foreign
tax credit that is protected against significant cross-crediting will
provide a strong incentive for existing U.S. resident corporations to
become resident corporations in countries with territorial systems.
Thus, the final element in a real worldwide system is a definition of
corporate residence that U.S. corporations cannot easily manipulate
by expedients such as reincorporating in foreign jurisdictions or being
acquired by a foreign corporation. We believe that such a definition,
based on shareholder residence, is feasible and appropriate, and we
will address this matter in a forthcoming article.'97
VII. WHY ONLY Two CHEERS?
Federal income taxation is the principal device for allocating the
cost of the U.S. national government among the residents of the
United States. While it is important that this allocation be made in a
way that serves economic efficiency, it is arguably equally important
that the allocation be made fairly.
The ability-to-pay concept 98 is the long-standing bedrock U.S.
principle for making a fair allocation of the income tax burden.'"
This is true even for the corporate income tax because, in our view,
196. See generally Fleming, Peroni & Shay, FormuiaryApportionmen suprd note 7,
at 18-29 (explaining why worldwide taxation without deferral and cross-crediting is the
preferred approach for reforming the U.S. international tax regime); Fleming, Peroni & Shay,
Perspectives, supra note 26 (same).
197. J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Defendig Worldwide
Taxation with a Shareholder-Based Definition of Corporate Residence, 2016 BYU L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016). For our preliminary work on this topic, see Fleming, Peroni & Shay,
FormularyApportionmen4 supra note 7, at 21-25; Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Designing a 21f
Century Corporate Tax, supra note 88, at 717-19.
198. For a detailed discussion of the ability-to-pay concept and the controversies
surrounding it, see Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Faness in International Taxation, supra note 2,
at 301 n.1.
199. See, e.g., League of Nations Econ. & Fin. Comm'n, Report on Double Taxation,
in 4 JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES
TAX CONVENTIONS 4003, 4022 (1962); RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE,
PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 232-40 (4th ed. 1984); Bluepnints for Basic Tax
Reform, supra note 27, at 1, 24; Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fainess in International Taxation,
supra note 2, at 318-21; Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Tation of the
Income of Multinational Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REv 18, 29 (1993); Martin J.
McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the Case for Progressive
Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REv. 1, 66-71 (1998); Robert L. Palmer, Toward Unilateral Coherence
in Determinig Jurisdiction to Tax Income, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 9-10 (1989); Joseph T.
Sneed, The Criteria ofFederaIncome TaxPolicy, 17 STAN. L. REv. 567, 576-80 (1965).
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that levy is best understood as a surrogate tax on shareholder
income.20
200. We note that several benefit-based rationales have been advanced to support the
existence of a separate tax on corporate income. See, e.g., GEORGE K. YIN & DAVID J.
SHAKOw, AM. LAW INST., TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 51-54 (1999)
[hereinafter ALI, PRIVATE ENTERPRISES] (acknowledging argument that separate corporate tax
is justified as a charge for the benefit of limited shareholder liability but finding the argument
unpersuasive); Calvin H. Johnson, Replace the Corporate Tax with a Market Capitalization
Tax, 117 TAx NoTES 1082, 1084-85 (2007) (arguing that separate corporate tax for publicly
traded corporations is justified as a tax on the liquidity benefit of access to public securities
markets); Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 965, 994 (1998-89) (same). But see Michael S. Kirsch, The
Congressional Response to Corporate Expatnations: The Tension Between Symbols and
Substance in the Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 24 VA. TAx REv 475 (2005)
(expressing doubts that the benefits of incorporating in the United States justify the
worldwide taxation of corporate income). We further note that some commentators have
rationalized the separate corporate income tax as a device for regulating corporate behavior
and as a charge for the burdens placed on society by corporate activities. See Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, Corporations, Society and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REv.
1193, 1254 (2004); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Letter to the Editor, Tax Reform in the
(Muli)National Interest 124 TAX NOTES 389 (2009). Other commentators have rationalized
the corporate tax as a tax on economic rents earned by firms operating in corporate form.
See MARK P. KEIGHTLEY & MoLLY F SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R42726, THE
CORPORATE INCOME TAx SYSTEM: OVERVIEW AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM 15 (2012).
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the corporate net income tax should be viewed as a backstop to the individual income tax.
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If fairness concerns were the only consideration, we would
advocate that the United States treat tax payments by U.S. residents to
foreign countries like any other business expense-as an allowable
deduction in calculating net income.201 The ability-to-pay principle
would be satisfied by allowing a deduction for foreign taxes because
the deduction would accurately measure the taxpayer's available
resources for paying U.S. income tax. Thus, a dollar-for-dollar credit
is overly generous from an ability-to-pay standpoint. Moreover, since
the bulk of U.S. foreign tax credits are taken by large U.S.
multinational corporations, the ultimate beneficiaries of this excessive
generosity are the owners of capital, who are concentrated at the
highest income levels.202 This largess is problematic from a
distributional standpoint.
We have seen in subpart U.A, however, that if the United States
responded to international double taxation with a foreign tax
deduction instead of a foreign tax credit, the result would be a chilling
effect on international trade and investment, leading to a serious
decline in economic efficiency and the economic welfare of the
country. Accordingly, the United States essentially has been faced
with a choice between (1) designing an international tax system that is
totally faithful to fairness/ability-to-pay concerns (i.e., that treats
foreign tax payments as income tax deductions) but that leaves
international double taxation substantially in place as a barrier to its
residents' foreign business and investment activities or (2) finding a
way to ameliorate the double-tax barrier while preserving the ability-
to-pay tax base to the greatest extent possible.
The first alternative has been judged unacceptable, and it is
difficult to quarrel with this outcome. The United States has elected
the second alternative and employs the foreign tax credit to
accomplish that end. This is simply a situation in which policymakers
have required an important value-fairness, as expressed in the
ability-to-pay principle-to give ground to another important, but
realization."). Because the § 11 tax on corporations is best explained as a substitute for a
current shareholder tax, the base of the § 11 tax should be consistent with the same ability-to-
pay principle that applies at the shareholder level-i.e., it should include all of the taxpayer's
foreign-source income. Real worldwide taxation achieves this end. Territorial taxation fails
to do so.
201. For a discussion of why a deduction for foreign income taxes is sufficient to
achieve fairness objectives, see Nancy H. Kaufman, Farness and the Taxation of
InternationalIncome, 29 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 145, 177-78 (1998).
202. See Edward N. Wolff, Household Wealth Trends in the United States, 1962-2013:
What Happened Over the Great Recession? 11 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 20733, 2014).
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conflicting, value-ameliorating international double taxation. The
compromise is a reasonable one203 and in no way invalidates the
proposition that an income tax system that gives great weight to the
ability-to-pay principle should generally include foreign-source
income in the tax base.2
Moreover, if the foreign country's income tax rate is below the
U.S. rate, the United States has the possibility of collecting a residual
tax on foreign-source income. Stated differently, where the foreign
tax rate is less than the U.S. rate, a foreign tax credit system
potentially includes foreign-source income in the U.S. tax base and, to
that extent, gives effect to the ability-to-pay principle. By contrast, an
exemption system would leave foreign-source income out of the U.S.
tax base in all cases, regardless of the relationship of the foreign tax
rate to the U.S. rate. This would amount to a blanket renunciation of
the ability-to-pay principle instead of a compromise between ability-
to-pay and mitigation of international double taxation. In other words,
a foreign tax credit system (without deferral and significant cross-
crediting) achieves a compromise between the ability-to-pay principle
and elimination of double taxation and does so without the distortions
of economic behavior resulting from an exemption system.
Notwithstanding the preceding justification, the U.S. foreign tax
credit mechanism indisputably compromises the important value of
ability-to-pay. For that reason, it merits only two cheers.
VIII.CONCLUSION
The foreign tax credit is a critical component of the highly
defective current U.S. worldwide international income tax system as
well as of a more coherent "real" worldwide system, without deferral
and significant cross-crediting, which we hope the United States will
adopt. This foreign tax credit regime has been subjected to various
criticisms which, if valid, may cast doubt on its efficacy as a double-
tax mitigation device and may strengthen the case for moving to a
territorial system. Thus, the soundness of the foreign tax credit is an
important element in the worldwide versus territorial taxation debate.
Moreover, real-world territorial systems often apply worldwide
taxation treatment with a foreign tax credit to passive income, to
income that bears a very low foreign tax, and to income of
203. For a detailed explanation of this point, see Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fainess m
International Taxation, supra note 2, at 328-33.
204. See generally id at 311-13 (demonstrating how the source of income is
immaterial to ability-to-pay).
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noncorporate taxpayers. Thus, the efficacy of the foreign tax credit
approach to ameliorating international double taxation is an issue that
is also relevant to territorial systems.
The U.S. foreign tax credit has been criticized for being
inconsistent with the economic standard of capital export neutrality,
for stimulating other countries to increase their source taxation of U.S.
residents, for undermining the efforts of developing countries to
attract foreign investment with tax incentives, and for failing to
incentivize U.S. residents to minimize their foreign tax liabilities and
thus increase their liabilities for U.S. residual tax. This last criticism
has resulted in a proposal to replace the U.S. foreign tax credit with a
deduction for foreign income tax liabilities coupled with a lower U.S.
tax on foreign income.
We have explained why full consistency with the standard of
capital export neutrality is not an important criterion for evaluating
the foreign tax credit. We have also explained why the U.S. foreign
tax credit is unlikely to have a meaningful restraining effect on foreign
tax minimization planning by U.S. residents or to cause problematic
behavior by foreign countries. In addition we have explained why a
foreign tax deduction coupled with a lower rate of tax on foreign
income would produce erratic results that would be inferior to
outcomes under a foreign tax credit regime.
We have also examined the role of the foreign tax credit in
allocating the international income tax base between residence
countries and source countries and concluded that the foreign tax
credit effectively imposes a "use it or lose it" rule that protects the
United States against efforts to erode the U.S. tax base by using low
tax rates to lure U.S. residents' business and investment activity away
from the United States. We have concluded that this "use it or lose it"
rule has an overall salutary effect and that untoward impacts on
developing countries should be addressed with bilaterally negotiated
tax sparing and direct monetary assistance.
Notwithstanding its virtues, however, the foreign tax credit
unavoidably conflicts with the principle of ability-to-pay. Although
we find this conflict to be an acceptable cost to bear in exchange for
resulting benefits, the conflict limits us to only two cheers for the
foreign tax credit.
54 [Vol. 91:1
